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From the Editors 
Shawn Thompson is the first to admit that he is not a scientist, and his essay does not 
pretend to be a scientific paper. Thompson, rather, makes an attempt to bridge the 
false divide between natural science and humanistic disciplines that was prominently 
established by C.P. Snow’s misguided notion of two cultures, an attitude which 
pernicioulsy persists across university campuses, popular media, and as shown here in 
courts of law. Thompson, working from the foundations of philosophy and legal 
theory, tries to reach scientists and their thinking in the battle for great ape 
personhood.  
 
Likewise, Thompson relies on Nonhuman Rights Project attorney Steven Wise, who 
calls on scientists to awaken the thinking of judges deciding the fate of great apes. 
Perhaps it’s an unfair analogy, but Thompson attempts to do with primatology what 
climatologists from several generations tried to do – demonstrate how science is part 
of and can dramatically affect public policy. Thompson shows how what is 
empirically rational in science is treated differently in the legal arena, and that 
difference poses a real problem in the question of granting personhood status and 
other rights to great apes. 
 
Why is the issue of great ape personhood important? That question will be answered, 
in part, by Thompson’s essay, the comments, and his reply to those comments. But 
Thompson can do only so much in 13,000 words. Is Thompson’s emphasis on Kant, 
rationality, and autonomy the only approach to ape personhood? No, as evidenced 
from some of the responses to his essay in the comments section.  
 
More so, the debate over ape personhood raises moral and ethical questions that have 
repercussions for human society and even the health and survival of creatues in the 
entire biosphere. For example, how should humans treat beings who have similar 
cognitive and behavioral tendencies? Do “similarities” really matter in terms of equal 
rights? Why should humans care about rainforest ecosystems? We can’t touch on all 
of that here, but issues related to those questions are implied in Thompson’s essay and 
addressed from a variety of perspectives and disciplines in the accompanying 
comments. In fact, some commentators express doubt that any “like us” argument in 
the fight for ape rights is effective since its near anthropomorphism ultimately 
excludes many other species, creates a false hierarchy and, therefore, neglects 
biodiversity. Thompson’s reply digs deeper into that concern and offers clarity about 
the need for a personhood argument.   
 
We are grateful to Professor Thompson for his very fine essay and thank all the 
contributors who agreed to comment. As in past issues since this is an international 
journal, we have permitted contributors and commentators to use British spelling and 
their own citation system. We hope readers enjoy this important and timely issue.  
 
Sincerely, 
Gregory F. Tague, Ph.D., editor 
Christine Webb, Ph.D., guest co-editor 
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Supporting Ape Rights: Finding the Right Fit 
Between Science and the Law 
 
Shawn Thompson 
 
Don’t expect a judge to think like a scientist. It’s not how the system works. 
 
The research of scientists has been a crucial component of seeking the rights of intel-
ligent species since animal rights lawyer Steven Wise of the U.S. Nonhuman Rights 
Project first filed a habeas corpus application for chimpanzees in December 2013. 
 
Wise cobbles together research into intelligent species like apes, elephants and dol-
phins with affidavits from scientists to use the material for a purpose it was never in-
tended, empirical evidence to support the legal arguments the lawyer is making that a 
chimpanzee is legally a person. 
 
If just one boldly rational judge will accept a habeas corpus application on behalf of a 
chimpanzee held in captivity against his will, that would be an acceptance of person-
hood and a huge advance in ape rights, worth all the years of effort that Wise has 
poured into this venture. It might also influence the way that humanity thinks about 
the intelligence of other intelligent beings on this planet.  
 
But scientists don’t design research to fit legal principles. For that reason, I want to 
start a discussion with this article of how research could be designed to fit the legal 
argument of Wise that a habeas corpus application should apply to a chimpanzee be-
cause the creature meets the basic legal principle of autonomy. 
 
To start a discussion like that means a change in thinking about the research. It means 
adapting research to the area where two very different domains of rationality, science 
and the legal system, overlap in an uneasy alliance. 
 
I want to start that discussion by describing the differences of the two domains of ra-
tionality, by examining the way they interact in court, and by speculating on what type 
of focus an investigation into the minds of intelligent species might support the legal 
argument of autonomy. What I will leave to others is the actual design and methodol-
ogy of this kind of research and the further development of what focus of investiga-
tion on the minds of intelligent species would be best. I may offer examples from my 
observations and from interviews I conducted relating to orangutans and the scientists 
and zookeepers working with them, but my examples are intended to illustrate the 
plausibility of conceptualizations of the minds of apes that would be useful legally. I 
use comparisons between people and apes, both ways, people to apes and apes to peo-
ple, following the researchers who believe that people and apes are so akin that the 
difference between them is one of degree, not kind. That, of course, is also a good 
premise, if it is right, for arguing rights for apes.  
 
To start the discussion, consider that the legal system is designed to make apparently 
rational decisions based on a priori principles when conclusive empirical evidence is 
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missing. How then is empirical science useful in a domain like the legal system that 
has a different form of proof and rationality from science? How do we conceptualize 
in a useful way the overlap and interaction of these two very different realms of 
thought? 
 
The approach, I will argue, should be to define and study the mental capacities that 
demonstrate the ability in intelligent species to act autonomously against “controlling 
influences,” a point that I will expand and extend from the 2018 amicus curiae brief in 
a court case arguing for ape rights by attorney Steven Wise. 
 
My main point is that any research intended to support the rights of intelligent species 
in court ought to be designed by a scientist who can also think like a lawyer and 
communicate like a United Nations translator across the confusion of tongues. It’s not 
impossible. 
 
Autonomy and general legal considerations for applying science in court 
 
My understanding of the issues in this article began on a rainy night in seaside Van-
couver in 2015 when I had dinner with lawyer Steven Wise of the U.S. Nonhuman 
Rights Project to discuss his legal strategy for an article I was writing for Philosophy 
Now magazine. What I learned that night also became crucial for the reports I would 
write over the next three years for the court case of an orangutan in faraway Buenos 
Aires. Luckily, I had no idea how complicated the legal issues would be and how pur-
suing rationality too far can take you to a puzzling and irrational place. 
 
Wise has to win a legal argument, not a moral or social or political one, using the spe-
cific rules of rationality that apply to the legal system. To do that, he has crafted his 
strategy in U.S. courts around habeas corpus applications and the extensive work 
done by him and his colleagues digging into the deep underlying legal principle of 
autonomy, which can trace its roots in Western thinking back to the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). The concepts of “person” and “autonomy” are not clear-
ly defined in the law and in legislation, although they are the underlying premises, as 
Wise realized. Some of the most precise thinking about liberty and autonomy was 
done by Kant and so Kant is useful, although judges may not be familiar with his 
work. The concept of autonomy not only has to be demonstrated and proved to the 
court, but developed and defined to the court in a way the court will accept under the 
circumstances. Then a judge, in the words of Wise, has to be encouraged to “imagine” 
a change in thinking from what is familiar to the judge in terms of the law and culture.  
 
Arguing a case in court is even more complex because, as Wise knows, judges don’t 
all think the same way like some kind of single, rational machine. Judges think in dif-
ferent ways and can make different rulings over the same circumstances. That is why 
there is often a political battle in the United States in the nomination of a judge to the 
Supreme Court. For all the mental discipline that judges have, they are also vulnerable 
to inclinations, biases and self-deception on the bench. The rationality of the legal sys-
tem has a shadow side of irrationality. The frustration and mental endurance of Wise 
is visible in an article he wrote for the Syracuse Law Review chronicling his struggle 
with the irrationality of judges and the legal system. It is the kind of intense legal 
ASEBL Journal – Volume 14 Issue 1, January 2019 
5 
 
drama that fascinates a lawyer. A lawyer has to understand the character of the mind 
of the particular judge listening to the case. 
 
In a habeas corpus application, it is important to make the distinction that Wise is not 
arguing primarily that a chimpanzee is intelligent, has consciousness and can reason – 
factors still crucial to the court cases and which scientists have been demonstrating in 
research – but that a chimpanzee is an autonomous being whose autonomy is related 
to his intellectual ability, the same point that Kant made more than 200 years ago 
about rational beings. Autonomous beings, in this argument, meet a certain threshold 
of being able to choose and act consciously and independently which, says Wise, 
“ought to be sufficient, though not necessary” to give them rights under a legal system 
based on liberty and autonomy. Wise cites the legal principle in his book Rattling the 
Cage: Toward Legal Rights for Animals that a person can have autonomy and rights 
even without cognition, consciousness and sentience. However, animals would not 
qualify for these legal rights if they are, as some believe, merely a kind of biological 
mechanism incapable of the intelligence and will power to make independent choices. 
 
For this article, I asked Wise what kind of research on intelligent species would be 
most useful for him in court, and he replied with comments that add to what he wrote 
in Rattling the Cage, as well as supplying a copy of the crucial amicus curiae brief 
submitted to support his appeal to the New York Court of Appeals in February 2018 
on behalf of the chimpanzees Tommy and Kiko. That amicus curiae brief is an excep-
tional document for the way that in 41, double-spaced pages it focuses concisely on 
the legal and scientific issues of personhood for intelligent species. The document is 
worth reading in its entirety and is available in a URL link to the Nonhuman Rights 
Project. https://www.nonhumanrights.org/blog/update-motion-philosophers-brief/ 
 
Wise is primarily making a legal argument that autonomy is a fundamental judicial 
value that can be applied to species like chimpanzees. Judges and the defendants in a 
habeas corpus application are unlikely to argue against the importance of the principle 
of autonomy, often leaving the evidence undisputed, but declare instead that a chim-
panzee simply doesn’t meet the criteria, whatever those are. Wise also told me that 
there is a strategic element in using autonomy apart from the way it is entrenched in 
the law. “The Nonhuman Rights Project does not make the autonomy argument be-
cause it believes that it is the best argument in the abstract. We make the autonomy 
argument because we believe that the judges highly value autonomy and we always 
shape our arguments in terms of the principles and values that the judges themselves 
say they value in their written decisions.”  
 
It is thus not a matter of how science defines autonomy, but how the legal system de-
fines autonomy and how the legal system accepts evidence of autonomy. So, how 
does empirical science support a non-biological, a priori, principle-based legal argu-
ment? That’s the rub. 
 
One important factor is the reliance of the legal system on witnesses and testimony. 
The court system relies on what it sees as empirical evidence and on the evidence of 
experts to interpret that empirical evidence to a high degree of probability beyond 
what the empirical evidence demonstrates. A scientist speaking to the court system 
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might want to argue in a more complex way that there is not really absolute proof, but 
empirical evidence that supports a theory or hypothesis, adding a layer of complexity 
that, while justified, also makes it harder for the court to understand. From the court’s 
point of view, if there is what the court sees as empirical evidence that a person was 
observed behaving a certain way, it would require a psychological interpretation 
through an expert witness to help understand if the behavior indicated a strong proba-
bility of a specific interior mental state. The court needs the scientist to speak to the 
court like a lawyer, a scientist and a translator. So Wise said to me, “In the jurisdic-
tions in which autonomy is the critical issue we submit complex affidavits from chim-
panzee experts that demonstrate that chimpanzees are autonomous.” The scientists do 
the crucial work of interpretation and make the significant connections, explains Wise. 
“It is primarily up to them to tie the cognitive characteristics they discuss to autono-
my, though sometimes we do it, as well.” Consequently, it would be even more useful 
if research was able to identify and isolate factors of autonomy in the behavior and 
cognition of intelligent species. 
 
The “mental capacities” legal argument for intelligent species 
 
Wise relies on the affidavits and amicus curiae briefs of scientists and university pro-
fessors as experts to interpret research for the court. The 2018 amicus curiae brief was 
the work of seventeen professors from universities in Canada and the United States, 
including Bernard Rollin, whose work on animal rights and human morality is well 
known. But the defendant can introduce evidence that contradicts the case of the 
plaintiff. Cases in court often come down to dueling witnesses, as I saw years ago as a 
court reporter. However, in a habeas corpus proceeding, there is no live testimony in 
court; the judge decides which affidavits of the experts are more believable to fit the 
legal principles that are also being debated by the lawyers. A judge is an expert in the 
law, not science. The judge does not know that testimony or an affidavit is true in the 
way that one scientist can assess the truth of the research of another scientist; the 
judge evaluates the credibility of the testimony or affidavit of an expert based on the 
credibility and truthfulness of the person and faith in the reputation of science.  
 
The 2018 amicus curiae brief – supporting Wise’s request to the New York Court of 
Appeals to review an unfavorable lower court decision – is an intriguing fusion of sci-
ence and legal principles and can be used as a guide for what scientists could do in 
research. The amicus brief cites four general categories often considered in court for 
personhood: 1. membership in a species as a biological category; 2. the social con-
tract; 3. the social dimension of community membership; and 4. mental capacities. 
The brief argues that both of the first two categories, namely species membership like 
Homo sapiens as a strictly biological category and the social contract, are not relevant 
to personhood. The defendants use the concept of the social contract to argue that 
chimpanzees can’t understand or act according to the moral responsibilities and duties 
of the social contract. Judges have also ruled against Wise on that basis, although 
Wise argues that those judges made a legal error. Wise said in a hearing in 2015 for 
the two chimpanzees Leo and Hercules that the Bern Court held in 1972 that person-
hood is a matter of public policy, not biology. Courts are in error, says Wise, if they 
don’t follow Bern to make personhood a public policy issue and instead make it an 
issue of biology. The argument against biology is that it produces arbitrary classifica-
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tions and distinctions that are not relevant to the legal rights of intelligent species. The 
amicus brief says that personhood “is not a biological concept and cannot be meaning-
fully derived from the biological category Homo sapiens. Moreover, species are not 
‘natural kinds’ with distinct essences.” The 2018 amicus brief also argues that the so-
cial contract is a misunderstood concept and irrelevant to personhood. Thus, research 
on these first two categories would not be useful for Wise. The brief argues for the 
third category of membership in a community that intelligent species like chimpan-
zees meet the criteria, but this is not where Wise wants to put the emphasis because he 
is focusing on the legal principle of autonomy. Thus research in the third category 
would have limited use for Wise unless it produced a demonstration of autonomy. 
 
Finally, the 2018 amicus brief argues what for Wise is the most relevant concept and 
thus the category where research would be the most productive. The final category is 
mental capacities such as reason, self-awareness, sentience, reciprocity, beliefs and 
desires, with which autonomy is related. It is here that Wise identifies the legal battle-
ground, to which the defendants and the judge respond. Of the mental capacities, the 
amicus brief says, “The Nonhuman Rights Project is arguing that chimpanzees are 
persons under a capacities approach to the concept of personhood. This reflects their 
view that this concept of personhood is already enshrined in law and that, as it stands, 
it applies to chimpanzees just as it does to humans. Affidavits by numerous eminent 
primatologists have attested to the fact that chimpanzees possess the relevant capaci-
ties to qualify as persons, and the First and Third Departments have not disputed the 
facts regarding chimpanzee capacities.” More specifically, “The Nonhuman Rights 
Project’s case is based on one particular capacity – autonomy – and this is for good 
reason. For one, it is a capacity that philosophers have historically associated with 
personhood. Immanuel Kant’s conception of persons is framed in terms of autonomy, 
such that we can be ends in ourselves.” The brief also explains another important rea-
son for concentrating on autonomy, “the concept’s direct connection to ethics,” which 
is also found in Kant. “Violating someone’s autonomy is widely regarded as a harm,” 
the brief says. I would later apply the same idea of violation of autonomy as harmful 
in reports I wrote for the court in the case of the orangutan in Argentina. 
 
Then the brief makes an important distinction. “However, Kant’s conception of au-
tonomy requires a great deal of cognitive sophistication, as it requires the ability to 
abstractly consider principles of action and judge them according to prudential values 
or rationality....On the Kantian view humans are rarely autonomous, and young chil-
dren and some cognitively disabled humans would fail to be autonomous actors, de-
spite appearances to the contrary.” Thus not all individual human beings are equally 
autonomous, but they would still deserve rights acquired at a low threshold for auton-
omy. The concept of low and high thresholds of humans compared to apes is an area 
of a back-and-forth struggle in the habeas corpus applications. Defendants often argue 
against the habeas corpus application in terms of a threshold that is so high that it ex-
cludes apes. But Wise counters that the high threshold also excludes some categories 
of human beings, such as infants and people in a coma. In Rattling the Cage, Wise 
also suggests an intriguing thought experiment on these issues, asking that if a few 
Neanderthals still existed, would we exclude them from human rights and treat them 
like chimpanzees. His general argument is that the low threshold of personhood that is 
fair in including all human beings also includes apes. 
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So how is Wise using science to define autonomy? Wise filed an affidavit in 2015 by 
Professor James King that defined autonomy as “behavior that reflects a choice and is 
not based on reflexes, innate behaviors or on any conventional categories of learning 
such as conditioning, discrimination learning, or concept formation. Instead, autono-
mous behavior implies that the individual is directing the behavior based on some 
non-observable internal cognitive process.” The phrase “some non-observable cogni-
tive process” opens up an area of ambiguity that may make the argument vulnerable. 
Can autonomy be judged on what is observed externally alone or is some internal ob-
servation necessary? What kind of internal evidence of autonomy could be produced? 
 
Three years later in 2018, in the amicus brief of that year, there is a more specific ex-
planation of the way that research fits the legal issue of mental capacities and autono-
my: “[T]he well-known U.S. bioethicist and philosopher, Tom Beauchamp, together 
with the comparative psychologist, Victoria Wobber, have suggested that an act is 
autonomous if an individual self-initiates an ‘action that is (1) intentional, (2) ade-
quately informed...and (3) free of controlling influences.’ Beauchamp and Wobber 
contend that chimpanzees fit their conception and the submitted affidavits previously 
referenced provide evidence to this effect. Chimpanzees can act intentionally (they 
can plan and act to achieve goals), and so satisfy (1). They learn how to navigate quite 
complex physical and social worlds, reflecting a ‘richly information-based and social-
ly sophisticated understanding of the world,’ and so satisfy (2).” The reference to be-
ing “free of controlling influences” is also an essential Kantian principle. The final 
sentence in this section of the amicus brief is more ambiguous, suggesting an area that 
research can develop. “Whether chimpanzees act free of controlling influences will 
depend on their environment and the options available to them, but there is no doubt 
that chimpanzees can so act when they find themselves in contexts without autonomy-
depriving controlling influences.” It would be a stronger argument that some chim-
panzees can also resist “autonomy-depriving controlling influences.” Thus I will argue 
later in this article that autonomy could be seen clearly and more intensely in situa-
tions that have powerful controlling influences, through factors such as innovation and 
resistance in an individual ape. 
 
The amicus brief focuses cognitive abilities through autonomy as Kant would. “As 
highlighted by Beauchamp and Wobber, [autonomy] brings together capacities to 
act intentionally (which assumes capacities to form goals and direct one’s behavior) 
and to be adequately informed (which assumes capacities to learn, to make inferences, 
and acquire knowledge through rational processes), each of which requires sentience. 
This means that an autonomous capacity requires other personhood capacities, namely 
sentience and rationality. So understood, evidence of autonomy is sufficient evidence 
of personhood. Thus, chimpanzees qualify as persons on autonomy grounds alone.” 
 
Possible concepts for developing research into autonomy for use in court  
 
Once we have a definition of autonomy that works reasonably well philosophically, 
legally and scientifically – which is quite a feat in itself – we want to know how the 
overlap of science and the law can be conceptualized to guide research to be useful in 
court. For the purposes of this article, I say again that I am trying to start a discussion 
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on the possible conceptualization of the overlap of science and the law, not trying to 
determine the methodology of the research or the actual design of the research. My 
examples are sometimes meant to illustrate the plausibility of the conceptualizations 
themselves, not to offer conclusive research. 
 
Taking a cue from the 2018 amicus curiae brief, the factor of autonomy – what Wise 
calls in Rattling The Cage a “more objective property” than some other properties –  
would be crucial to pursue in research, perhaps through the Kantian notion of being 
able to act freely and consciously against what the brief calls “controlling influences.” 
Kant argued that controlling influences, even including internal ones like emotion and 
instinct, are contrary to autonomy. The cognitive abilities of human beings allow hu-
man beings to resist controlling influences, including emotions, such as love, compas-
sion and empathy, which some scientists and philosophers see as the “moral emo-
tions” from which evolution, biology and culture produce a higher order of human 
morality. It sometimes seems as though Kant was proposing a supra-rational human 
being acting on pure reason totally separate from controlling influences even like the 
“moral emotions,” a kind of rational monk isolated in a lonely cell, but Paul Guyer 
rehabilitates Kant from that impression. Guyer argues in his 2007 book Kant’s 
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals that readers should not be misled by the 
way Kant presents his thought experiments. The reasoning process of Kant, in order to 
achieve clarity, separates elements that actually interact and support each other. It is 
the process of analysis in Kant that artificially separates the parts to examine them 
individually, then puts them back together again, like taking a mechanical watch apart 
to see how it works. Thus pure reason has primacy and priority over the positive mor-
al emotions, to cultivate and control and apply those supporting emotions in the best 
way and to prevent them from interfering when that interference would be wrong. 
Guyer quotes Kant from the Metaphysics of Morals saying that sympathy and joy 
have been “implanted in human beings by nature...to use as the means for the promo-
tion of an active and rational benevolence....For here the human being is not consid-
ered merely as a rational being, but as an animal endowed with reason.” So, Kant al-
lowed for a lower threshold of reason and autonomy to accommodate the mass of hu-
manity and still have morality and autonomy. Depending on how Kant is interpreted, 
it seems that he could be used to support or undermine rights on the “animal” side of 
nature. 
 
Of course, in the case of human beings in the court system, based on a priori legal 
principles and not empirical standards, human beings don’t have to prove they are au-
tonomous, only at times to find ways to escape legal responsibility in certain situa-
tions by arguing that they temporarily lost their autonomy and so cannot be held re-
sponsible for their actions. Wise says in Rattling The Cage that judges are content 
with both the “potential autonomy” of a human being and “the legal fiction” that “all 
humans are autonomous” without the need for empirical proof. It would be an inter-
esting predicament if human beings had to routinely prove that they acted rationally 
and did not allow themselves to be controlled. 
 
As for the habeas corpus applications for apes and intelligent species, scientists could 
develop research along Kantian lines to demonstrate that an ape acted against both 
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exterior and interior influences, such as self-interest, immediate gratification, instinct, 
and social and political pressures. 
 
Four possible conceptualizations to examine autonomy in a strong way might be 1. 
innovation, 2. altruism, 3. self-control, and 4. resistance, disobedience, or defiance. 
These are typically disruptions, paradoxes and enigmas and thus difficult to under-
stand and to study with the tools of rationality. Traditionally, as the untraditional Jen-
nifer Nedelsky reminds us in Law’s Relations: A Relational Theory of Self, Autonomy, 
and Law, autonomy is a capacity of the individual against the group and exists as a 
relationship with others, not simply as a form in isolation. 
 
1. Innovation requires a new and autonomous act. It might either be a creative or 
unique solution to a problem or a creative or unique new application of something 
already known. It might be most observable in the action of an extraordinary indi-
vidual rather than a group, maybe the lone Einstein ape or the Karl Marx ape, and 
so requires individuality and individual differences. An individual may discover 
or create an innovation, which is then shared in the group and perpetuated, alt-
hough all the members of the group did not create it. And innovation is highly 
valued in human culture as part of the value of intelligence. “Innovation has fre-
quently been regarded as a marker of human and animal intelligence, and to de-
pend on domain-general cognitive abilities,” according to Simon Reader, Julie 
Morand-Ferron, and Emma Flynn in their paper, “Animal and human innovation: 
novel problems and novel solutions.” “Indeed, the ability to solve novel problems 
and to innovate appears in definitions of intelligence, which means that, for some, 
innovativeness is a defining feature of intelligence.” Innovation is already being 
studied by primatologists in intelligent species in terms of creating tools, develop-
ing communication and developing culture. A typical observation is that a group 
of orangutans on one side of a river develops tools, shares new knowledge and has 
ways of communicating that a group on the other side of the river doesn’t have. 
This is the approach taken by Carel van Schaik and a group of eight leading 
orangutan primatologists who published their groundbreaking findings on culture 
in orangutans in the journal Science in 2003. The article identifies “innovation” as 
an empirical factor to describe the phenomena of observable “variants.” The evi-
dence of innovation in this instance is not found by studying a group, but by stud-
ying the meaningful differences between groups who don’t have contact. Differ-
ences in innovation can also be studied in comparison between wild and captive 
apes. Research by van Schaik and others indicates that the behavior of captive 
apes is different from wild apes and that innovation may increase in captive apes. 
It may also be that a conscious original application of existing information, maybe 
even including the ability to experiment and to attempt to find solutions, is a 
threshold for autonomy. It may also be that innovation is the work of a group 
working together as a team over an extended period of time, making small contri-
butions that are remembered and put together later by other apes, to produce an 
innovation, which might be more difficult to observe. Some ways of thinking may 
perceive innovation as the domain of individuality and other ways of thinking 
may see innovation as the domain of a team. Reader, Morand-Ferron, and Flynn 
survey different concepts of innovation in research, including within a social con-
text. Innovation and autonomy are also found in deliberate use of deception. “Tac-
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tical deception in primates...[is] identified [in] many novel behavior patterns,” say 
Reader, Morand-Ferron, and Flynn. In order for deception to work at a conscious 
level, an ape needs to be aware that it can think differently from another being, in-
cluding human beings, to manipulate the thinking of that other being. Primatolo-
gists have told me fascinating stories of how orangutans worked to deceive human 
beings. Orangutans and chimpanzees in zoos have been able to deceive human be-
ings and find innovative ways to escape their enclosures. 
 
2. Altruism is another autonomous act. In its purest Kantian form, altruism would 
not have a benefit or self-interest for the individual who acts altruistically, and 
would not be an act performed as a commercial transaction for a kind of payment. 
Maybe the act of altruism would even entail a personal risk or cost to an individu-
al acting against self-interest. For example, aside from the inspiring tale of Tar-
zan, the Homo sapiens raised by a female ape, there are non-fiction examples of 
an ape protecting a human child. Frans de Waal, whom I interviewed on the issue 
of ethics in apes, cites an example in his 2005 book Our Inner Ape: A Leading 
Primatologist Explains Why We Are Who We Are of an eight-year-old female go-
rilla named Binti Jua who came to protect a three-year-old boy who fell into her 
enclosure in 1996. De Waal cites an example from Jane Goodall of an adult chim-
panzee who lost his life trying to rescue a small infant from drowning. Even if 
stronger examples of altruism can be found of apes helping other apes, it might be 
more compelling in court to give examples of apes helping human beings. As for 
whether these are really acts of altruism, de Waal stands on the biological side of 
the argument, similar to the biological perspective of Matt Ridley in his 1996 
book The Origins of Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation. 
De Waal in Primates and Philosophers talks about human morality emerging 
from emotion, biology and evolution, which are shared with the great apes and 
developed by humans to a greater degree than the great apes. De Waal makes the 
case for an “evolved morality,” a kind of natural and continuous advancement 
through stages with “morality as a logical outgrowth of cooperative tendencies” 
and thus suitable for empirical description. At this point, Kant and science collide 
and have different perspectives. Science is very efficient at finding continuity, 
even in change, but from a Kantian perspective, autonomy may incorporate an el-
ement of discontinuity, of disruption, of breaking away, which is difficult to iden-
tify, particularly in a process of reasoning based on continuity. It should also be 
noted that while Kant is cited for identifying pure reason as a radical break from 
nature, he did, as Guyer says, also say that nature had given human beings the 
moral emotions, which Kant says we should cultivate to strengthen morality.  
 
How could research be designed to demonstrate a Kantian altruism? The critical 
point would be to identify when one thing becomes something else that is distinct 
and different from what it was before. When, for instance, does animal nature be-
come human nature? When does supportive social behavior become altruistic be-
havior? I asked de Waal in a private interview at a science convention, “Is there a 
threshold that demonstrates that something is a moral being?” He replied that 
chimpanzees demonstrate altruism in making sacrifices for the benefit of another 
ape, but that human morality is “a different level.” De Waal says in A Very Bad 
Wizard that chimpanzees have the same moral emotions as human beings, but are 
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not “moral beings in the human sense.” For de Waal, in human beings there is a 
level of reasoning that “distances” them from apes. But, says de Waal in Our In-
ner Ape, “It’s impossible to extract from this mixture [of natural tendencies, intel-
ligence and experience in humans and apes] what is inborn and what is not.” And 
so it goes with science and interpretation. An ape can be observed risking his or 
her life to save a member of another species, but is that done autonomously or un-
der some kind of inner or outer controlling influence? Could sympathy, empathy 
and altruism have important biological survival value for apes to act that way to-
wards each other which makes the existence of these mental capacities merely a 
controlling influence? How could research be designed to support in court that an 
ape acted in a purely altruistic way? 
 
3. For self-control to be demonstrated strongly, it would be an action against imme-
diate self-interest or immediate gratification and would involve planning, cogni-
tive ability and persistence. There is interesting research on self-control in chil-
dren developed by Walter Mischel and pursued by others, commonly known as 
the marshmallow test, and also contrasting research by Stanley Milgram that some 
people are also inclined to obey authority automatically without thinking. In the 
research into self-control by Walter Mischel, children were offered the choice of 
the reward of something like a marshmallow immediately or two marshmallows at 
a later time. The children who have self-control have cognitive strategies to plan 
and to delay gratification. Apes have also been observed waiting, planning and de-
ferring gratification. Two researchers at Georgia State University, Michael Beran 
and William Hopkins, applied a kind of marshmallow test for chimpanzees. The 
research, called the Hybrid Delay Task and published in 2018, measured how 
chimpanzees were able to wait for a better reward. Benjamin Eisenreich and Ben-
jamin Hayden comment on the research of Beran and Hopkins with chimpanzees, 
saying, “The ability to persist across time in the face of temptation is the key to 
self-control.” I may have seen an example of self-control with apes myself in 
2010 when I was allowed into the section of the Taipei zoo where the public does 
not have access. In that incident, a male orangutan and a female orangutan who 
both wanted to have sex, denied themselves and resisted biological urges because 
the two-year-old child with them objected. The male, to vent his frustration, went 
to a corner and pulled and banged on the fire hoses used for climbing. But that 
could always be interpreted another way. Was that really self-control or yielding 
to another controlling influence that has to do with parenthood and social rela-
tions? Research that could show in apes some self-control against influences and 
persistence over time against obstacles might support the argument for autonomy. 
What would be the strongest way to design research to show self-control in apes? 
 
4. As for resistance, disobedience, or defiance as acts of autonomy, it is a form of 
behavior we know very well as human beings. When human beings feel they are 
being controlled against their will and their sense of autonomy is insulted, they of-
ten find ingenious ways to resist a much more powerful force. We see that in war-
fare, in crime, in politics, even in science. We see that at the beginning of Western 
rationalism in the defiance of Socrates against the state and society in ancient 
Athens, which resulted in a trial and a death sentence and then a narrative in phi-
losophy ever since trying to understand rationally Socrates the contrarian. The ca-
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reers of a number of remarkable scientists, including Jane Goodall and Frans de 
Waal, have been a narrative of resistance against politics, religion, culture and 
scientific ideologies. Resistance can be overt, or passive but visible (as with Gan-
dhi and civil disobedience), or clandestine (forms of anonymous and sometimes 
unperceived sabotage). If apes have a sense of autonomy, they would respond to 
what they feel limits their autonomy in ways they find intolerable. It may be that 
the more cognitive ability an intelligent being has, the greater its sense of autono-
my, and the more pronounced the reaction to a loss of autonomy. 
 
One of the places where defiance is seen most clearly in human beings and is ap-
plicable to apes, is in conditions of harsh captivity, such as prisons, gulags, pris-
oner of war camps and refugee camps. The disciplines that are well developed in 
terms of defining and studying defiance in those instances and which may offer 
assistance in theory are political science, sociology and criminology. Even the 
harshest systems of prisons and gulags have been unable to stop crime and politi-
cal protest. Defiance is a factor that can’t be controlled. For intelligent species, a 
zoo is a kind of commercial penitentiary for paid entertainment, although society 
may now be divided in seeing it that way. Nevertheless, I remember interviewing 
those dealing with captive situations, such as prisoners in penitentiaries, from 
which I produced a book, and also orangutan keepers in zoos, from which I pro-
duced another book. In both cases, prisons and zoos, the power to control the in-
mate is one-sided and extreme. Yet, as I saw, and as others have studied and 
chronicled, in both prisons and zoos the inmates clearly assert their independence 
and their will by acts of defiance. In terms of zoos, in the facility in Taipei, in a 
Taiwanese culture where control and obedience are expected of both people and 
apes, I learned how the orangutans act out their defiance deliberately. In a way 
they intended to frustrate their keepers, who had trouble understanding that the 
orangutans simply didn’t respond obediently to power and authority. The 
orangutans could achieve no obvious benefit in defiance except the frustration of 
their keepers and the ability to demonstrate their own power and will. My inter-
views with orangutan keepers in the United States, Australia, the Netherlands, 
Singapore and Spain, reinforced that interpretation. An orangutan understands 
what a keeper wants and will help the keeper who treats the orangutan well and 
oppose the keeper who doesn’t. An orangutan will consciously do what the other 
individual doesn’t want because the other doesn’t want it. An example would be 
cooperating voluntarily when the keeper wants the orangutan to transfer to a dif-
ferent area or making the transfer as difficult as possible. As Steven Wise said to 
me, a chimpanzee may not be able to understand the social contract, but she 
knows that she doesn’t want to be kept in a cage. Defiance is a clear act of auton-
omy against powerful controlling influences.  
 
Behind the scenes in a much-publicized orangutan court case in Argentina 
 
I used what I learned from Steven Wise to inspire three reports I wrote over 2015-
2017 for Judge Elena Amanda Liberatori in Buenos Aires in a case seeking freedom 
for the orangutan Sandra from the zoo in that city. It was a rare opportunity to witness 
the development from the inside of an ape rights case that attracted considerable me-
dia attention around the world. The court story was followed by major news outlets in 
ASEBL Journal – Volume 14 Issue 1, January 2019 
14 
 
the West, including the United States, England and Canada, but, from my perspective 
on the inside, it was not the process of abstract rationality that might be assumed. It 
felt like navigating a crowded airline terminal in a foreign country at night with the 
signs in an indecipherable language. If you make the flight, you feel immense relief. 
 
I knew that there is no magical legal formula that simply causes change to happen in 
the law through a court case. Change seems to come in the law when an autonomous 
decision is made, supported by empirical evidence, but not determined wholly by the 
empirical evidence. For advances in the rights of intelligent species, what is needed is 
the right conjunction of lawyers like Steven Wise in the United States and Andres Gil 
Dominguez in Argentina who continue to push the legal boundaries undeterred by the 
opposition and a judge who is autonomous and courageous. I knew that Liberatori was 
a good candidate for that. In 2010, she had made other controversial decisions to rec-
ognize same-sex marriage and to allow same-sex partners to have children.  
 
I had frank email conversations with Liberatori that allowed me unusual insight into 
her thinking and the legal process. Her openness and frankness surprised me, after my 
experience with the reticence of Canadian judges from my time as a court reporter. I 
knew from emails with Liberatori that she had a genuine interest in the rights of the 
orangutan Sandra and I thought she would only be limited by what she believed that 
the law allowed her to rule. That encouraged me to be rational and yet bold in the re-
ports I wrote for the court. Like any judge, Liberatori was worried that her decision on 
Sandra would be overturned on appeal. She commented to me that her decision had 
bothered many people in Argentina and Spain, which I had seen myself in the way 
that the attorney general of Buenos Aires had twisted science in questioning the court 
case in an article he wrote for a newspaper while Liberatori was in the middle of the 
case. At one point she said that she was dealing with a “whole judicial and non-
judicial structure” that did not fit “the spirit and commitment that I personally put into 
this case.” She told me that her decision in 2015 to release Sandra from the zoo was 
“on the edge” or mediating between the two worlds of human and ape that we have 
been taught to believe are separate. Liberatori believes it should be a single world.  
 
The case of the orangutan in Buenos Aires created some political heat for the judge 
because of what Frans de Waal would call “chimpanzee politics” among Homo sapi-
ens. The attorney general of Buenos Aires, Julio Conte-Grand, wrote an opinion piece 
for the newspaper La Nacion in Argentina with the headline “Darwin ha muerto.” The 
attorney general said that the court case was “a death sentence for Darwin’s theory” of 
natural selection and it was making Darwin roll in his grave. This case, the attorney 
general said, is a reverse Darwinism where human beings are “inferior” to “monkeys” 
and “monkeys are descended from human beings.” The case was contrary to nature 
and the divine, he said. There were 429 comments posted to the attorney general’s 
article online. I wondered how much pressure Liberatori felt by the public involve-
ment of the attorney general and the way he could influence a public sentiment ready 
to be inflamed.  
 
I asked the editor of La Nacion, since the court had apparently accepted me as an expert 
in the case, if I could have equivalent space and position to reply to the attorney general. 
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The editor said no, so my reply was published in another newspaper online in Argenti-
na. Liberatori was following this newspaper battle closely and appreciated my response. 
 
In my too wordy, 1,500-word public response to the attorney general I said that sci-
ence would survive the trial, that the judge was not killing Darwin, that “evolution is not 
a system of ethics and evolution should not be used to make ethical decisions.” 
 
I brought together two orangutan experts I know personally, Gary Shapiro of the 
United States and Leif Cocks of Australia, to make an advisory committee of the three 
of us for the court. I had been invited to participate initially as an apparent expert by 
the association of lawyers for animal rights in Argentina known by the Spanish acro-
nym AFADA, but I was kept in the dark about the context of legal principles on which 
AFADA was basing its case and I had no interaction with the other experts used. In 
this case, I noticed that the court was willing to rely on experts with only academic 
credentials and textbook knowledge, rather than practical experience of orangutans in 
the wild and in zoos, like Cocks and Shapiro, which made their participation even 
more essential. This struck me as a blind spot in the legal process involving intelligent 
species. It seemed easy for a judge and lawyers and even scientists to assume that all 
orangutans were an abstraction that could be culled from a textbook and would be ex-
actly alike. I responded to what others said to the court by pointing out instances 
where a textbook abstraction about orangutans would be contradicted by experience in 
the field or where textbook contexts for orangutans in the wild would not suit 
orangutans in captivity. I emphasized the individuality of Sandra and the need to de-
termine that individuality and to respect it. 
 
The reports I wrote for our group of three were supposed to advise on what would be 
humane conditions, and that is where I thought there was a crack in the door that I 
could exploit to expand the conditions to what would suit an autonomous intelligent 
being. The practical choice, although it was less than ideal, was not to free Sandra in 
the wild as she deserved, but release her to a sanctuary where she could survive. That 
was because Sandra was bred in captivity and she was not adapted to release in a jun-
gle that was foreign to her. She had no instruction from her mother, like a normal wild 
orangutan would have, of how to survive as an orangutan in the jungle environment of 
an orangutan. Because of her captivity with human beings, Sandra hadn’t learned how 
an orangutan survived in an orangutan world. It is exceedingly rare that an ex-captive 
orangutan has been released in the wild and survived. Leif Cocks is believed to be the 
first person to have done that, releasing the 14-year-old orangutan Tamara, born in a 
zoo in Australia, into a reserve in Sumatra. Cocks thought that special conditions 
would allow Tamara to survive in the jungle unlike other ex-captive orangutans. 
 
What actually happened in the court cases involving the orangutan Sandra has been 
widely misunderstood and without wishing to be needlessly tedious in this article, let 
me be at least somewhat tedious with the legal details. AFADA tried first what Steven 
Wise was doing in the United States, filing a habeas corpus application in Argentina. 
That habeas corpus application finally failed on appeal in late 2014, but the judges’ 
decision said that “los sujetos no humanos (animales) son titulares de derechos” or 
that Sandra was a “subject of rights.” The key phrase meant that even “non-human 
subjects (animals) are right holders.” But, as the information spread from Argentina 
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around the world, the phrase about rights for “non-human subjects” was replaced with 
the phrase rights for a “non-human person” understood in the context of what that 
phrase seemed to mean in the pursuit for personhood rights in the common law system 
of the United States, not Argentina, which is a civil code legal system. In a common 
law system like the United States, Canada and Great Britain, the ruling of a judge can 
set a precedent that could be applied to all similar future cases.  
 
The next attempt to help Sandra was a legal action called amparo, the specific type of 
amparo that seeks a quick solution to urgent circumstances, in this case the possibility 
of the risk to the life of the orangutan in a zoo. This is the case that Liberatori heard 
and she quickly dug into it with enthusiasm. It was a case particularly suited to her 
interest in expanding rights. 
 
Here is how Liberatori summarized in her final decision the argument that AFADA 
made before her, in a translation from Spanish to English made by the court: “this suit 
of legal protection against the Government of the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires 
and the Zoological Garden of the City of Buenos Aires, for ‘...infringing in a clearly 
illegal and arbitrary way the right to freedom of movement, the right not to be consid-
ered an object or thing susceptible of ownership and the right not to suffer any physi-
cal or psychological injury that, as a non-human person and a subject of law the 
ORANGUTAN SANDRA is entitled to rights…’” But how could the judge use the 
civil code law in Argentina to issue a ruling on this that she clearly wanted to make 
despite her knowledge of the opposition there was? 
 
The decision of Liberatori built upon the earlier habeas corpus application for Sandra 
brought by AFADA in 2014 and other developments in civil codes. In her ruling, Lib-
eratori set a clear context and limitation for her use of the phrase “non-human person.” 
What Liberatori actually said in her decision in late 2015, as translated from Spanish 
to English by a court-appointed translator, was: “The categorization of Sandra as a 
‘non-human person’ and consequently as a subject of rights should not lead to a rushed 
and out-of-context statement that Sandra is thus a holder of human people rights...As 
it is shown, Sandra’s legal recognition as a ‘non-human person’ incorporates a catego-
rization that does not change the one existing in the Civil Code between possessed things 
and people. This is the solution by the recent reform to the French Civil Code by means 
of the category ‘sentient beings’ which connect the obligations by human people to-
wards animals.” The judge quoted the argument of AFADA in her decision, “animals, 
as sentient beings must be able to benefit from some fundamental rights, as the right 
to life, to freedom not to endure sufferings, that is to say, to the protection of their 
basic interests.” 
 
Liberatori had made a clever legal argument that Sandra is a non-human person under 
the Argentina Civil Code. The previous ruling was that the orangutan was a subject of 
rights, thus inherently more than an object or piece of property, although also not a 
human being. Liberatori explained to me, in my rough translation from Spanish, “The 
Argentine Civil Code states that you cannot exercise abusive rights, therefore you 
cannot inflict suffering on a living being.” She said that a “novel categorization” of 
“sentient being” was introduced in the French Civil Code in January 2015. Declaring 
Sandra as a non-human person, the judge told me, does not mean that she acquires the 
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basic rights of a human being, which is what the Nonhuman Rights Project is attempt-
ing to do in the United States. The judge explained that her ruling “incorporates a cat-
egorization that does not change the existing [one] in the Civil Code between goods 
and people. It is the solution of the recent reform of the French Civil Code through the 
category of ‘sentient beings’ that connects the obligations of human beings towards 
animals.” The duty of human beings is thus refined in a way that benefits living crea-
tures. In other words, human beings have a duty in the law to be more humane. Liber-
atori’s ruling of Sandra as a sentient non-human person opens a new legal relationship 
allowed in the Civil Code in the distinction between person and thing. A more correct 
term might be “sentient thing,” but then Liberatori’s use of the term “non-human per-
son” may have some weight of its own that opens future legal arguments. “Indeed,” 
the judge said to me, with a patience towards me that I can only admire, “I refer to 
Sandra as a ‘non-human person,’ a category like you well said is not recognized in the 
Argentine Civil Code in which it still persists as a ‘thing.’ I make this denomination 
with the purpose of changing prevailing paradigms, as a principle of seeing this reality 
differently and in light of the fact that my word is that of a judge, in charge of the file 
in which I will have to resolve when the time comes – by procedural rules – both with 
respect to Sandra’s personality – to which I personally have no doubts – as to other 
technical issues such as her eventual release.” The judge told me she took the phrase 
“non-human person” from a book by Valerio Pocar in Spanish, The Rights of Non-
human Persons. “A work very valuable indeed,” she said. In her final decision, as I 
had anticipated, the judge cited the issues of autonomy and of suffering as a way to 
identify the borders of sentience and consciousness. The judge also embraced, like 
Steven Wise, non-biological arguments, such as the arbitrariness of biological classi-
fications, including the classification of “person,” which she called “social construc-
tions,” citing Spanish sources. If the classification “person” is a social construction, 
then a judge like Liberatori could amplify the “construction” in a rational way. Libera-
tori wrote in her decision that the ruling for Sandra does not change the two legal cat-
egories of person and thing, but, as I interpret, opens a new legal relationship between 
a human being and a sentient being that the judge believes the Civil Code allows. It 
thus seems that the ruling of Liberatori and the legal status of Sandra as a non-human 
person under the Civil Code of Argentina is not the same legal status that Steven Wise 
is seeking for basic personhood rights for a chimpanzee under the common law sys-
tem of the United States. I will leave it to authentic legal minds to sort out this distinc-
tion and make better sense of it than I can. 
 
Sandra was thus granted release from a zoo, with the details yet to be determined in 
another lengthy and complicated process of transferring her elsewhere, with Sandra 
unconscious of what was happening. As I had told the court during the case, because 
she was born in a zoo and was not psychologically adjusted to be freed in the jungle, 
she would trade one form of captivity, a zoo, for another form of captivity, a sanctu-
ary, although we all hoped at a higher level of treatment, perhaps even approaching 
what a zoo-bred, captive-born orangutan should be entitled to in an enlightened world 
as a non-human person. I knew that even if the judge could not change the legal status 
of Sandra to personhood rights, the judge could order conditions that would improve 
the life of Sandra in a way consistent with personhood. That might then help to create 
a new legal standard for conditions of an ape in captivity.  
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From Liberatori’s decision I could interpret which parts of the reports that I wrote had 
influenced her by what she paraphrased or quoted. The judge said the sources “indi-
cate that orangutans are thinking, sentient, intelligent beings and genetically similar to 
human beings, with similar thoughts, emotions, sensitive and self-reflective ones; that 
they have a culture, a capacity to communicate and a rudimentary sense of right and 
wrong; an individuality of their own, with a unique history, character and prefer-
ences....The empirical evidence is that orangutans are a thinking, sentient and intel-
ligent species, genetically similar to human beings, with similar thoughts, emo-
tions and sensitivities and self-reflexive.” 
 
Then the judge repeated what I had put in the reports to expand the terms for hu-
mane treatment of an orangutan in captivity for a being that is autonomous and 
requires autonomy. I tried to expand the criteria of suffering, knowing that it is an 
important legal issue, and connected autonomy with issues of suffering. I was us-
ing advice on how to design a humane enclosure for Sandra in reverse as an op-
portunity to define what makes an orangutan autonomous. The advice was based 
on the premises I wanted accepted and which I knew didn’t need to be argued in 
an order the judge could make to change the conditions of captivity. To be hu-
mane, the enclosure would have to be designed in terms of how an orangutan 
thinks of autonomy, not a human being. For example, physical freedom of move-
ment for an orangutan has a vertical dimension of climbing trees that doesn’t ap-
ply to human beings. It is thus a loss of freedom to confine an orangutan to a 
space that is only horizontal and flat. Taking an orangutan out of the trees is like 
taking a fish out of the water. The judge thus said in translation repeating the re-
ports: 
 
• “Space for orangutans is tridimensional, not bidimensional as it is for human 
beings...To be deprived of the natural need for space to a serious degree, 
causes suffering....Sandra’s need for space should be respected.”  
• “To be deprived of the natural need for privacy, causes suffering.”  
• “She is a Being with a high level of [consciousness] and sensitivity, loss of 
freedom and of choice to a high degree, constitutes a form of suffering. Con-
sequently, in human societies revoking freedom and choice is used deliber-
ately as a ‘punishment.’ Orangutans are highly conscious of power and free-
dom in relations. They also feel the loss of power and the loss of freedom and 
they suffer for that...” 
• “And that the forementioned must tend to avoid any type of suffering generated 
[in] her due to man[’s] interference in her life; however, given her condition of 
birth in captivity and that she is a hybrid whose parents are from Sumatra and Bor-
neo, this accounts for both her existence and her life conditions [that] are the sole re-
sult of human manipulation, [and] irreversible...In this last sense, the experts 
have indicated that ‘Sandra is at the same time an individual orangutan, with 
her unique and own history, character and preferences and, genetically, a 
member of a species she does not know, and of a species that live[s] in a habi-
tat and a climate that she does not know either...Sandra is a unique person-
ape, with her own history, character and preferences that must be respected 
when making the decision that is most convenient to her.’” 
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Liberatori concluded her decision with directions expanding the rights of Sandra to 
conditions suitable for her mental life: “The Government of the Autonomous City of 
Buenos Aires must guarantee Sandra adequate conditions of [her] habitat and the ac-
tivities necessary to preserve her cognitive skills.” Later, the higher court on appeal 
avoided discussion of whether Sandra was a non-human person but upheld Libera-
tori’s decision that the living conditions of Sandra be improved. Liberatori was able to 
order that a technical committee would determine how Sandra’s conditions would be 
improved. My committee and I were not part of the technical committee, but we were 
asked to comment on its provisions. 
 
One point I wanted to make to the court was that an autonomous being needs the right 
to decide when to socialize. Orangutans are described as a solitary species in compari-
son to highly social and political species like chimpanzees and gorillas, but at times 
they want to associate with other orangutans. The report I wrote for the judge there-
fore said that Sandra as an autonomous being had a right to make choices and a right 
to associate or not associate with other orangutans when she wanted. 
 
I thought the judge might balk at an idea that seemed impractical or impossible to 
achieve. Leif Cocks, with his extensive knowledge of zoos, provided the practical way 
to apply that. A locking system could be created so that two orangutans could decide 
individually if they wanted to enter an area together. The gate for each orangutan 
would allow that orangutan to open that gate onto a shared area. It is thus possible to 
give a captive orangutan freedom of choice.  
 
Our report even said that Sandra’s preferences as an autonomous being should be re-
spected if the decision was whether to send her from the zoo to a sanctuary. What if 
Sandra preferred captivity where she was to an unknown sanctuary? Does an autono-
mous being have the right to make bad choices? I used in the reports an example of 
the autonomy of Sandra that came from a detail in her history. The zoo in Buenos 
Aires said that it had tried to mate Sandra with an orangutan she knew and put her in 
an enclosure with the male. But Sandra sat outside in the rain and snow to distance 
herself from her assigned spouse. I interpreted that as a deliberate choice that indicat-
ed autonomy. So, in deciding Sandra should leave the zoo for a sanctuary, should her 
preferences be considered or is freedom just what human beings decide is best for an 
ape? 
 
Orangutans can’t talk to us and tell us what they want, although in the late 1970s Gary 
Shapiro had limited success in the jungle of Borneo in teaching a young ex-captive 
named Princess to communicate in human sign language. If orangutans can’t talk to 
us, I asked Cocks and Shapiro, how can we argue to the court that it is feasible to un-
derstand the preferences of Sandra? 
 
Cocks and Shapiro had the answer right away. So the report said: “Sandra is a unique 
ape person with her own history, character and preferences that need to be respected 
in making a decision that suits her. The standard of assessment for her potential for 
preferences and choice should be a general behavior assessment against normal stand-
ards for orangutan behavior, and the identification of known aberrant behaviors in 
general, such as stereotypical behaviors that are linked to mental health in an orangu-
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tan. In addition to this standard of assessment, there is a credible empirical way to as-
sess the preferences and choices of Sandra, as developed by Gary Shapiro (who also 
taught orangutans sign language in the jungles of Borneo) and by well-known prima-
tologist Biruté Galdikas, who operates a facility without walls for ex-captive 
orangutans in Tanjung Puting National Park, in Kalimantan, Borneo. The method is to 
establish a personal rapport with Sandra, which is important for her comfort and co-
operation, and to present her with a series of image/object pairs to observe which im-
age/object she more often attends to or interacts with over a period of presentations. 
Orangutans can learn to point to preferred items with training, but even by repeating 
the presentation of paired items and observing her consistent behavior, her preferences 
and choices can be inferred by a compatible and observant human being. This should 
be done early to determine Sandra’s baseline preferences. Sandra’s need for freedom 
and choice needs to be respected.” 
 
Finding the next Lord Mansfield sitting on the bench somewhere 
 
In writing this article I tried to confront honestly and rationally the legal issues of ar-
guing in support of ape rights, but that idealistic Kantian approach ignores elements 
that don’t fit well into a purely rational way of thinking. The argument for extending 
personhood rights to intelligent species has developed through Western rationality as 
an issue of rationality and intelligence in these species, using a human model for ra-
tionality and intelligence. The legal system continues that line of thinking. Thus the 
price of admission to join the human tribe with all its legal benefits is Western intelli-
gence, which reflects the idealistic image we have of ourselves, despite the prevalence 
of contrary examples like irrational voting trends that elect irrational and dangerous 
people who wreak havoc in the world. Are there factors of chance and irrationality 
that need to be understood in considering how to support ape rights through the legal 
system? 
 
Consider that Steven Wise of the Nonhuman Rights Project seems to be pursuing the 
most logical, most ethical, most humane, and best legal strategy available. Why hasn’t 
he won a habeas corpus application yet? He seems to be inching closer, particularly 
with the glimmer of hope offered by Judge Eugene M. Fahey in May of 2018 in a 
group decision to deny leave to appeal from the New York Court of Appeals. Fahey 
began by writing, “The inadequacy of the law as a vehicle to address some of our 
most difficult ethical dilemmas is on display in this matter.” The judge said, “I write to 
underscore that denial of leave to appeal is not a decision on the merits of petitioner’s 
claims. The question will have to be addressed eventually. Can a non-human animal 
be entitled to release from confinement through the writ of habeas corpus? Should 
such a being be treated as a person or as property, in essence a thing?” Then the judge 
agrees with the legal argument that Wise has been making: “The better approach in my 
view is to ask not whether a chimpanzee fits the definition of a person or whether a 
chimpanzee has the same rights and duties as a human being, but instead whether he or 
she has the right to liberty protected by habeas corpus....[W]e should consider whether 
a chimpanzee is an individual with inherent value who has the right to be treated with 
respect....The issue whether a nonhuman animal has a fundamental right to liberty 
protected by the writ of habeas corpus is profound and far-reaching. It speaks to our 
relationship with all the life around us. Ultimately, we will not be able to ignore it. 
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While it may be arguable that a chimpanzee is not a ‘person,’ there is no doubt that it 
is not merely a thing.” 
 
Yes, that’s it. That’s what Steven Wise has been arguing. Isn’t that a sign of progress? 
One theme in the narrative of ape rights is the theory of progress in human liberty. We 
can take heart from that. We look at the persons who were originally disenfranchised 
in history, from the rise in the experiment of democracy in ancient Athens where there 
were citizens, slaves and women with different rights. The experiment in democracy 
in the founding of the United States at a time of slavery is similar. Over time, accord-
ing to this account of rights, there is progress. Rights have been extended to slaves, 
women, children, immigrants and so on. And then we project this narrative of pro-
gress into the future to convince ourselves that it is inevitable that in time that person-
hood rights will be extended to other thinking, sentient beings. We use that argument 
to convince ourselves and to convince others. But the human acceptance is lagging, 
even with judges and scientists. 
 
When I read the court transcripts of the cases of Steven Wise and marvel at the ration-
al dexterity of his arguments, I also see in the arguments of the opposition some glib-
ness and self-deception. At one point the state lawyer defending against the case for 
the chimpanzees Leo and Hercules posed a blatant slippery slope argument. He said, 
“I worry about the diminishment of these rights in some way if we expand on them 
beyond human beings...You’re absolutely opening the possible flood gates...in appli-
cations that could affect our society in a negative way.” It is amazing that a state law-
yer would even argue that it deserves consideration how the privileged would be af-
fected by the expansion of rights. That argument could be used against freeing slaves 
and giving rights to women and immigrants. It reminds me of the attorney general of 
Buenos Aires arguing in La Nacion that the case of rights for the orangutan Sandra 
diminishes human beings. 
 
Practically, Wise is aware, as he says in Rattling the Cage, that judges are human be-
ings and can be swayed from legal principles by their all-too-human attachment to 
culture and religion. He knows that the court system is not isolated from the world 
outside the courtroom and that changing the perception of the legal system alone 
won’t work. He knows that he needs to apply more than pure rationality. Wise says 
outright in an article for the Syracuse Law Review that “a change in public attitude” 
also has to be created. “Present judges have been raised in a culture that pervasively 
views all nonhuman animals as ‘things’...Present judges are therefore likely, automat-
ically and unconsciously, to be biased against the personhood arguments [the Nonhu-
man Rights Project] presents – just as they are likely to be biased about race, gender, 
sexuality, religion, weight, age, and ethnicity – because our minds have been shaped 
by the culture around us. In fact, they have been invaded by it...We therefore expected 
to encounter puzzling and diverse judicial reactions to our early cases. We were not 
disappointed.” “Perhaps,” writes Wise on the Nonhuman Rights Project website, “the 
most unfortunate way in which a court undermines its own fundamental values and 
principles of justice is when it grounds its decision wholly upon an implicit or explicit 
bias.” A fascinating chronicle of the battle of Wise against irrationality in the court sys-
tem can be found in the article he wrote for the Syracuse Law Review and the posting 
on the Nonhuman Rights Project website, “Letter #1 from the Front Lines of the Strug-
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gle for Nonhuman Rights: the First 50 Months.”  
 
Wise said in the Syracuse Law Review that he knew he needed to find not a “formal 
judge” but a “principle judge” who would take the risk to rule in a boldly rational way 
when other judges see only what one judge called “a leap of faith” that he didn’t want 
to make in an ape rights case. Wise writes that the awareness that no member of an 
intelligent species had ever been declared a person in court would affect judges. There 
is pressure on judges not to make changes. It is, writes Wise, “a nearly insurmountable 
problem for common law ‘formal judges,’ who understand justice as stability and cer-
tainty, and who are likely to feel themselves strongly bound by precedent at some lev-
el of generality. This is as opposed to ‘principle judges,’ who understand justice as 
doing what is right, or ‘policy judges’ who understand justice as doing what is good. 
The political obstacles also might be stronger in a state, such as New York, in which 
judges are elected, depending upon how the voters feel about the judge granting a 
common law writ of habeas corpus to a chimpanzee.” So, part of the legal strategy is 
to study the character and values of the judges themselves through the documents of 
their rulings as a kind of legal anthropology of those on the bench. 
 
Wise says that he realized he had to find his own Lord Mansfield, the British judge 
who ruled in 1772 on the case of a black child named James Somerset, kidnapped in 
Africa, sold to a merchant in Virginia, moved to London and then hunted down to be 
recaptured after he escaped, to be shipped to Jamaica and sold in a slave market. 
Mansfield did alone what was unprecedented at the time, issued a habeas corpus deci-
sion for a black slave and changed the law and society. “On June 22, 1772,” Wise 
wrote in the Syracuse Law Review, “Mansfield declared that slavery was so ‘odious’ 
the common law would not support it and ordered Somerset’s release, thereby implic-
itly abolishing human slavery in England.” Thus says Wise, the Nonhuman Rights 
Project “is seeking its Lord Mansfield, judges whose rational and reflective sides 
might become aware and powerful enough to allow them to recognize, and struggle to 
equalize or overturn, their automatic unconscious biases against treating a nonhuman 
animal as a rights-bearer, the way Lord Mansfield brought himself to hold that blacks 
were rights-bearers more than two centuries ago. They exist. But many judges will be 
unable to shake their biases, and so the duty will fall to their children and grandchil-
dren, who are maturing in the new culture that is no longer uncritically accepting of 
the legal thinghood of all nonhuman animals.” Lord Mansfield is like a unique align-
ment of the stars in the dark night, the good fortune of an unexpected, unpredictable 
event. 
 
In the same way, when I asked Judge Elena Liberatori how the law could be changed 
to make Sandra a legal person, the answer was finding the right lawyer and the right 
judge. The judge replied, “It requires what is actually happening, a lawyer willing to 
raise these new things in the courts like Dr. Gil Dominguez and judges like me willing 
to face many things. This is not new for me and I accept the challenges of achieving a 
better world and that this is not mere words.”  
 
 
 
 
ASEBL Journal – Volume 14 Issue 1, January 2019 
23 
 
Conclusions 
 
That is as far as I can take the discussion at this time. At the risk of being needlessly 
repetitive, let me be somewhat repetitive and add some more words to the page.  
 
Human beings have the capacity to act rationally and irrationally. From a Kantian per-
spective where rationality is a form of freedom, not a controlling influence in itself, 
when we choose to act rationally, we are acting autonomously, to free ourselves from 
controlling influences, to benefit others, as we ought to do as ethical beings. 
 
As rational beings we ought to make rational arguments for the rights of a fellow in-
telligent species. There is more to life than just an exploding population of Homo sa-
piens littering and congesting this once spacious and pristine planet. Maybe our ethics 
should be larger than just our own self-interest as a species. 
 
It is a rational argument that the differences between human beings and apes in bio-
logical classifications are arbitrary and yet it is a rational argument that the differences 
will always be differences. We can’t prove that apes are human beings. We can only 
argue that apes are sufficiently like human beings. 
 
But what does “sufficiently like” mean and how can it be determined? That is a judg-
ment, as Kant would say. It is an autonomous ethical decision. There seems to be no 
empirical way to determine when different sentient beings are sufficiently alike to jus-
tify basic equality. That is the gap in perception, interpretation, belief and judgment 
that will likely always remain – at least until a boldly rational judge, bolstered by a 
priori legal principles, makes a decision that influences others. That is the Lord Mans-
field factor, always a possibility, always a hope, never assured, an unpredictable 
event. We wait and wish that the stars will align at the right moment for the next Lord 
Mansfield to appear. 
 
For a strategy in court based on the legal principle of autonomy, science could lend its 
weight by paying attention to the conceptual area where science and the law overlap. 
Research could be designed to define autonomy more clearly and to demonstrate au-
tonomy in a stronger way to the court system. This research would concentrate on 
what is practical and reasonable to assert without getting lost in the forest of deeper 
philosophical debate. A judge doesn’t need absolute certainty, just a high degree of 
probability. And a judge will accept expertise in an area that the judge does not pos-
sess. The place of science is to add weight to reach the tipping point, but the judge 
will decide in the end on the basis of how the evidence fits the legal principles that he 
or she understands and values. A judgment will be made at that time. 
 
In the meantime, while looking for his next Lord Mansfield, Steven Wise continues to 
pursue his long legal battle using the legal argument of autonomy. So far, more than 
half of the courts that received a suit from the Nonhuman Rights Project have refused 
even to grant a hearing. Wise is undeterred. Some human beings just have a capacity 
for persistence that succeeds where others fail. It is how change and innovation hap-
pen.  
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C O M M E N T S: Responses to Shawn Thompson 
 
Gary L. Shapiro 
 
What kind of research would best support an animal rights lawyer seeking personhood 
status for his client? Professor Shawn Thompson asks this question because he wishes 
to support animal rights lawyers seeking to free imprisoned great apes with the kind of 
evidence that would hold up in court. It is a vexing and complex matter of legal al-
chemy: how to transubstantiate an “animal thing” into an “animal person.” 
 
Thompson is no stranger to disenfranchised hominids. He has written on incarcerated 
humans (Letters from Prison 2002) as well as caged and uncaged orangutans that have 
lost their freedom and continue to lose their forest homeland (The Intimate Ape: 
Orangutans and the Secret Life of a Vanishing Species, 2010). No surprise he was 
drawn to the case of the caged orangutan Sandra several years ago along with Leif 
Cocks and me, to form a team of experts to testify on her behalf in a celebrated case in 
Argentina.  
 
Thompson does a wonderful job of explaining Sandra’s story, but not before he covers 
some important ground on the complexities of law and science in cases that have 
sought personhood status for chimpanzees in the United States. He covers the work of 
animal rights lawyer Steven Wise and his efforts to seek habeas corpus relief for two 
chimpanzees, Tommy and Kiko. Those efforts have not yet yielded freedom for the 
two great apes, but the legal dialog has been sharpened awaiting the right judge to 
take the moral leap to grant these two sentient beings personhood status and sanctuary 
in Florida.  
 
Thompson examines the amicus curiae brief filed by Wise’s Nonhuman Rights Pro-
ject in early 2018, in response to an unfavourable lower court decision regarding 
Tommy and Kiko. The amicus brief cites four general categories often considered in 
court for personhood: membership in a species as a biological category; the social 
contract; the social dimension of community membership; and mental capacities. The 
first two, biological and social contract, would be extremely difficult to argue in fa-
vour of great ape personhood. Yet even with strong examples for the second two gen-
eral categories, community membership and mental capacities, Wise has been focus-
ing on the principle of autonomy to make his case for personhood. Autonomy, accord-
ing to bioethicist and philosopher Tom Beauchamp and comparative psychologist 
Victoria Wobber, would be inferred from actions an individual self-initiates that are 
(1) intentional, (2) adequately informed, and (3) free of controlling influences. Wise 
has relied on the testimony from experts on the sophisticated cognitive domains of 
chimpanzees to support the case for autonomy. For example, behaviours observed 
experimentally or anecdotally that show goal formation, self-directed tendencies, as 
well as the capacity to learn, make inferences and acquire knowledge, would strength-
en the autonomy argument. According to Wise, evidence of autonomy is “sufficient 
evidence of personhood.”  
 
Thompson continues to build upon this notion that researchers could look at autonomy 
through some conceptualizations including innovation, altruism, self-control, and re-
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sistance, disobedience and defiance. He examines the implications of each concept, 
and it seems clear that clever researchers could come up with various experimental or 
observational scenarios to illustrate examples of each by individual and groups of 
chimpanzees. That, however, is not Thompson’s task.  
 
Nevertheless, Thompson’s essay is a call to action, and one that is deftly constructed 
to address the need to build more scientific ammunition for animal rights lawyers who 
are arguing for great ape personhood status. It is a matter of time before the right 
judge comes to a bench in the United States where he or she will agree to hear the is-
sues and rule in favour of the non-human person. In the meantime, a possible “low 
hanging fruit” strategy would include providing compelling evidence to animal rights 
lawyers in other countries, such as Austria, Switzerland, and New Zealand where re-
cent laws in the latter country have conferred sentient status to all animals. It would 
make sense to network among international animal rights lawyers to advocate for 
great apes, cetaceans and elephants in countries where more progressive judges sit on 
the bench. Great ape personhood would, as in the case of Sandra in Argentina, become 
established to a limited degree, then expand and deepen to full personhood status over 
time. As the world became more open to the idea through social media networks, it 
would migrate eventually to more conservative countries, such as the United States, 
where the legal conversion would be inevitable.  
 
We owe it to our great ape cousins to continue the fight to “punch the hole in the 
wall,” as Steve Wise has said, to allow those animals who are treated as things to pass 
through this illusory barrier and become legal persons. It will be a true testament of 
our humanity to take this bold step. 
 
Notes 
 
Beauchamp, Tom L. and Victoria Wobber. 2014. “Autonomy in chimpanzees.” Theoretical Medicine and 
Bioethics, 35 (2). 117-132.  
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Beyond the Personhood Paradigm 
 
Nicolas Delon 
 
Shawn Thompson’s target article provides a fascinating insight into judicial activism 
for the recognition of the legal personhood of great apes, focusing his discussion on 
Steven Wise’s Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP) and reports he wrote over 2015-
2017 for a court case in Buenos Aires, Argentina, seeking release from a zoo for the 
orangutan Sandra. Thompson describes both the philosophical underpinning of a legal 
battle and the concrete obstacles faced by plaintiffs. His thought-provoking picture of 
courts is one of conflicting commitments: rational legal frameworks and reasonings 
and irrational biases, prejudices and inclinations. Thompson sketches what scholars of 
jurisprudence would dub a “realist” account (Leiter 2017), depicting judges as deeply 
influenced by mundane factors, social and economic norms, but also moral and politi-
cal commitments, and different views of policy. Hence, it should be no surprise that 
courts – even “policy” (vs. “formal”) judges – do not respond fully predictably and 
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rationally to philosophical arguments. I don’t think they should be expected to, given 
that philosophy doesn’t point in one single direction and that the purview of scientific 
expertise is more limited than Thompson suggests. Even Thompson cites Wise’s 
acknowledgement that the law should not rest on biological facts. My response to 
Wise’s and Thompson’s strategy is two-fold: 1) personhood is neither strictly deter-
mined by cognitive facts nor fruitfully construed in Kantian terms, and 2) personhood 
is not what matters when it comes to animal protection. To conclude, 3) I hint at an 
alternative, or complementary, avenue for change.  
 
1) Autonomy that matters 
Many philosophers doubt that other animals have the metacognitive abilities required 
for robust autonomy. They cannot reflect on their desires, aims and conceptions of the 
good. Even authors who argue for animal rights (e.g. Alasdair Cochrane, Christine 
Korsgaard) claim that animals lack autonomy. I, however, think they have an interest 
in freedom because they can be autonomous in another sense. While fascinating in 
their own right, Thompson’s “conceptualizations” of autonomy – innovation, altruism, 
self-control, and resistance/defiance – risk raising the threshold for autonomy higher 
than needed. They could be evidence of autonomy (sufficient criteria), but they are not 
necessary. 
Why think that robust autonomy is necessary for captivity to be harmful? As many 
authors have noted (e.g. Gruen, Donaldson and Kymlicka), just like with disabled 
humans and children, animal autonomy can be construed relationally. On this view, 
animals make choices about what to do, when, where and with whom to do it, when 
allowed to. And, while freedom from external control matters, expecting complete 
removal from influences and dependency would undermine anyone’s claim to auton-
omy. Contextual freedom of options is constitutive of a good life and captivity inter-
feres with it. This doesn’t presuppose the robust form of autonomy used by Wise, 
NhRP, and Thompson. By the same token, freedom applies to a much wider range of 
animals. Perhaps the capacity for culture, language, or self-consciousness makes cap-
tivity worse for apes, elephants and cetaceans. But if animals are to have a right to 
liberty, it can be grounded on less demanding grounds than robust autonomy.  
While NhRP’s case centrally rests on autonomy, the authors of The Philosophers’ 
Brief build a broader base according to which chimpanzees are persons on all defensi-
ble accounts of personhood. One such account rests on ‘community’: personhood is 
“something that we achieve through development and recognition within a community 
of persons.” This account, I believe, is a more promising route to personhood (Delon, 
ms). If personhood is the path to rights that NhRP wants to pursue, they need to shift 
away from the narrow individualist cognitive paradigm. But I want to shift away from 
the personhood paradigm itself. Captivity, when it hampers agency, undermines the 
material conditions constitutive of a good life, the physical and social environment 
central to flourishing, from access to territory, resources, mates and companions to 
opportunities for play and exploration. This is not just true of very cognitively sophis-
ticated animals, nor does this require person-characteristic autonomy (Delon 2018a). 
2) Personhood is not what matters  
My rejection of the personhood strategy has two prongs. First, why should we take 
personhood as the determining criterion of legal protection? As acknowledged in The 
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Philosophers’ Brief (Andrews et al. 2018), there are at least four conceptions of what 
grounds legal personhood, two of which they find acceptable – community member-
ship and cognitive capacity. The authors argue, rightly, that chimpanzees like Tommy 
and Kiko meet the criteria for each conception. Judges should rationally recognize that 
these animals are persons, barring an unacceptable conception of personhood based on 
either social contract or biological membership. What these disagreements show is 
that personhood is not an uncontroverted intuitive ground for legal protection. The law 
stipulates who counts as a person independently of philosophical conceptions to which 
judges are reluctant to be hostage. As Thompson suggests, judges often operate with a 
roughly Kantian conception of autonomy regarding personhood. But this undercuts 
the strategy. For Kantian autonomy is very restricted (e.g. Korsgaard does not rest her 
case for animal rights on autonomy). It’s unclear if any human being is ever so auton-
omous, much less any nonhuman animal. Whatever problems plague the social con-
tract approach seem to plague the Kantian approach. So, the autonomy that matters for 
protection against wrongful captivity is not that which grounds personhood.  
 
This leads me to the second prong: priority. In terms used by effective altruists for 
cause prioritization, a given area has a certain importance, neglectedness, and tracta-
bility. Assessing these requires a broader perspective. Ninety-eight percent of the an-
imals with whom we interact in some way in the U.S. are farm animals, the over-
whelming majority of which are poultry (Wolfson and Sullivan 2004). These animals 
have no meaningful legal protection in most U.S. states, let alone federally. The per-
sonhood strategy turns priorities on their head by focusing on an extremely narrow 
subset of animals, whose treatment, if deplorable, is better than that of factory farmed 
chickens. Moreover, farm animals receive proportionally less attention than both 
companion animals and animals held captive in zoos, circuses, and labs. Finally, we 
have only patchy evidence that the current strategy has delivered significant goods 
beyond even a handful of individuals, let alone their conspecifics and members of 
other species. Wise often seems to imply that personhood rights will open the gate for 
wider reforms (as a necessary step), while trying to reassure judges that the scope of 
his pleas is restricted. One problem is that, if not anthropocentric, Wise’s strategy is 
prone to evoke the idea that apes matter insofar as they are like us (Nussbaum 2018). 
Something chickens are less prone to. But you can’t have it all. Either the scope of the 
case is restricted, but then NhRP cannot expect to help other animals, or it’s not, but 
then judges are nowhere near being convinced. For now, anyways, the spillover ef-
fects remain to be seen.  
 
Two concessions are in order. First, the Argentinian case in which Thompson took 
part bears promise. Second, Animal Charity Evaluators, a cost-effectiveness-focused 
meta-charity, has designated NhRP as a “standout charity” because of its potential to 
improve animal lives. But, to the first point, Thompson himself notes that Judge Lib-
eratori’s decision in the orangutan Sandra’s case is largely qualified, if only because 
Argentina is not a Common Law country: “The categorization of Sandra as a ‘non-
human person’ and consequently as a subject of rights should not lead to a rushed and 
out-of-context statement that Sandra is thus a holder of human people rights...[It] does 
not change the [categorization] existing in the Civil Code between possessed things 
and people.” Judge Liberatori alludes to the inclusion of the category “sentient be-
ings” (not persons) in the French Civil Code. The point is: personhood isn’t required, 
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at least at this stage, as a necessary step toward increased protection. As for the second 
point, ACE’s doubts overlap with mine. It is unclear how well the personhood strategy 
can carry over to billions of other lives. On the other hand, one could imagine that 
implementing basic humane protections for farmed animals would have a dramatic 
impact, but doing so necessitates changes in social norms (Delon 2018b).  
 
3) Social norms 
As noted by Thompson, NhRP made some recent progress despite repeated setbacks. 
Many activists have cheered on the opinion of an Associate Judge on New York’s 
Court of Appeals as a harbinger of change. The Court refused to hear NhRP’s motion 
for further review of a lower court decision on behalf of Tommy and Kiko. But Judge 
Fahey noted: “While it may be arguable that a chimpanzee is not a ‘person,’ there is 
no doubt that it is not merely a thing,” while urging the court to engage with the nec-
essary public policy debate.  
Are we observing a change in attitudes? Can a judge’s opinion have significant influ-
ence on institutions susceptible to change? Lori Gruen (2015) and Martha Nussbaum 
(2018), among others, have expressed skepticism about NhRP’s strategy, albeit on 
different grounds. My claim is, although a precedent would not be trivial, a single 
court’s decision would hardly affect the treatment of a wide range of cognitively com-
plex species, much less most farm animals. 
Is pitting the judicial strategy against social norms a false dichotomy? The former 
could foster social change. Yet we can also surmise that a court’s decision or judge’s 
opinion are mostly symptoms rather than causes of change. We beg the question in 
assuming that courts are effective causes, rather than reflections, of change underway 
(Rosenberg 2008). The law is a mirror, however imperfect, of shifts in attitudes and 
behavior. But absent such shifts, the law remains weak. If the deck of attitudes and 
behaviors is heavily stacked against animals, “the boundaries of the legal community” 
are unlikely to expand (Leiter 2013) on judicial grounds alone. The capacity of courts 
to produce social change is disputed. Gerald Rosenberg (2008) has argued against the 
prospects of social reform through litigation and purported to demonstrate that the 
women’s rights, pro-choice, civil rights, and marriage equality movements did not 
make widespread progress through courts. Judicial rulings cannot enable significant 
change unless it is already underway or also supported by the Executive and Legisla-
tive branches. Social movements, Rosenberg suggests, should direct their resources to 
political mobilization, grassroots organizing, and other forms of activism. Rosen-
berg’s argument should at least give us pause when considering a decades old strategy 
that has so far been stonewalled. Fortunately, we need not choose between social 
change and advocating for nonhuman rights in courts. 
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Science in the Court:  
Animal Behaviour and Non-human Personhood 
 
Elise Huchard 
 
The recognition of non-human personhood could have profound implications for our 
relationship to the natural world, by encouraging the creation of a legal status recog-
nizing the intrinsic value of some non-human entities, such as ecosystems or animals. 
Animals have interests, in the sense that things can be good or bad for them, and 
whether things are good or bad for them depends on their own perceptions (Korsgaard 
2013). The recognition of legal personhood for (non-human) animals is a means to 
ensure that these interests are duly considered, by granting them basic rights – such as 
the right to life, freedom and not to be tortured. To some, animals should be protected 
by law, but using the legal personhood status is not the way to go (e.g., Cupp 2015). 
Court cases fighting for the recognition of non-human personhood nevertheless have 
the laudable ambition of highlighting the shortcomings associated with the bipolarity 
of most contemporary legal systems, which only admit two categories: things that can 
be used as mere means to someone else’s end, or persons who are ends in themselves. 
The latter status is automatically and exclusively granted to humans (though it has 
historically left some humans out), and there is little leverage to confer legal protec-
tion to non-human entities. The existence of anti-cruelty laws in many legal systems 
embodies the mainstream idea that animal welfare is worthy of protection for its own 
sake. However, without any other form of legal protection, it is easily disregarded in 
the face of ‘more important’ things (Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011; Korsgaard 2013). 
Requesting legal personhood for animals is thus a pragmatic approach to open a 
breach in a legal world divided into persons and things, even though it’s not necessari-
ly the only legal avenue to increase the protection of animals’ interests. 
 
The existence of court cases requesting legal personhood for animals should be of in-
terest to scientists studying animal behavior like myself, because lawyers arguing such 
cases, as pioneered by Steve Wise, have used the results of behavioural research as a 
key component of their files (Wise 2000; Thompson 2019). In recent decades, studies 
on the cognitive, emotional, and social capacities of other species have blurred tradi-
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tional divisions structuring historical discussions on human specificities – including 
the opposition between nature and culture (e.g., Laland and Galef 2009), between an-
imal objects and human subjects (e.g., Bekoff 2000; Bekoff, Allen, and Burghardt 
2002; de Waal 2009), and between instinctive and rational actions (e.g., Hurley and 
Nudd 2006; Reader, Morand-Ferron, and Flynn 2016). These findings have fed the 
parallel development of animal ethics, the field of philosophy concerned with the 
moral status of animals, which is expanding to the point that many major contempo-
rary ethicists have addressed this topic (e.g., Singer 1975; Regan 2004; Nussbaum 
2009; Donaldson and Kymlicka 2011). Court cases on animal personhood actually 
represent a legal extension of these ethical developments, which may lead to further 
legal and political ramifications down the road. As animal behaviour scientists, we 
may thus face increasing pressure to generate or review knowledge that can feed phil-
osophical debates of direct legal and political relevance to the moral status of animals. 
While many of us may find such expectations stimulating, we may also feel unpre-
pared and uncomfortable to jump into such debates, for the sake of preserving our sci-
entific objectivity, or on the basis that scientific results are devoid of normative value. 
Yet, it is often difficult, in practice, to generate knowledge and escape subsequent 
questions regarding its relevance to society.  
 
In this context, the essay of Professor Shawn Thompson (2019) has a lot to offer to 
scientists who wish to explore the intersection between philosophy, science and the 
application of the legal concept of personhood to (non-human) animals. In a clear and 
thought-provoking text, he delivers a fascinating testimony of how lawyers build court 
cases, focusing on the exact nature of empirical evidence typically valued by judges. 
He first sets the stage with a thoughtful description of the profound cultural divides in 
the way science and justice assess and treat empirical evidence, before revealing stra-
tegic tips on the use of evidence in the legal battlefield pioneered by Steve Wise and 
colleagues in the United States (Wise 2000). He subsequently identifies critical gaps 
in the scientific knowledge needed to instruct legal cases, and goes as far as proposing 
concrete research directions to fill them. He finishes by reflecting on his personal ex-
perience acting as an expert for the court of Buenos Aires, which in 2015 made use of 
habeas corpus to consider release of a captive female orangutan from a zoo into a 
sanctuary – a judgment which remains a historical victory of this legal front.  
 
Research findings in animal behaviour have proved critical for building such legal 
requests. One may nevertheless wonder, based on Thompson’s considerations, wheth-
er science has the potential to inform future cases any further. Thompson indeed de-
lineates a relatively narrow area of focus which consists in gathering empirical evi-
dence indicative of legal ‘autonomy,’ a key underlying principle in traditional defini-
tions of legal personhood – one rooted in Kantian philosophy and relating to an indi-
vidual’s free will (Korsgaard 2013). Empirical approaches around such a concept pose 
a major challenge because it is not directly amenable to a falsifiable demonstration (in 
the epistemological sense) as it is difficult to confirm subjective mental states in (non-
human) animals.  
 
Although evidence suggestive of autonomy appears particularly relevant to the con-
cept of legal personhood (Thompson 2019), building cases on such basis comes with 
the inconvenience that sufficient evidence might often be hard to gather, so that the 
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number of eligible species is restricted and might be biased towards those that are best 
studied or most closely related to humans. It may ultimately be suitable that the insti-
tutional defense of animals’ interests relies on a more inclusive and less anthropocen-
tric criterion, such as sentience, which might also be more amenable to empirical stud-
ies, and is more consistent with major theories in animal ethics (Singer 1975; Don-
aldson and Kymlicka 2011; Francione 2006). The use of such a criterion would facili-
tate the application of a precautionary principle wherever sufficient evidence is lack-
ing, so that an absence of evidence is not, in practice, treated as an evidence of ab-
sence (Birch 2017).  
 
Nevertheless, the choice of the ‘autonomy’ criterion has been constrained by legal 
institutions so far, and Thompson argues that empirical limitations in the study of au-
tonomy could be partially overcome by documenting a capacity for innovation, altru-
ism (in the Kantian sense, which implies a conscious decision), self-control, or an 
ability to resist or disobey – a suite of traits that are suggestive of free will, and ‘the 
legal principle of autonomy.’ More generally, ethological studies that use concepts 
rooted in classical philosophy and referring to mental states that are not directly ob-
servable would benefit from an interdisciplinary effort associating scientists and phi-
losophers to (i) establish more inclusive definitions (i.e., applicable to study animals) 
that are not devoid of their initial meaning nor of empirical traction, (ii) reflect on the 
most efficient empirical approaches, and (iii) discuss what may represent sufficient 
evidence of the existence of such phenomena.  
 
Thompson points to another way where scientific input could be useful in legal de-
bates: by synthetizing and interpreting published evidence for the court. Unlike scien-
tific experts who regularly intervene in court cases and are well aware of the legal cul-
ture, such as criminologists or psychiatrists, behavioural scientists are generally un-
prepared for such an exercise. Thompson’s text will be a vital source of information to 
those from whom such expertise may be requested. More generally, reviewing and 
communicating scientific findings for a lay audience is a crucial responsibility of sci-
entists – because who else can? – and scientists working on animal behaviour may 
expect to be increasingly solicited on broad ethical questions regarding human-animal 
interactions given the growing public interest in this conversation, and the common 
perception that specialists of animal behaviour are well-positioned to inform it.  
 
Overall, Thompson’s essay proposes an example of how scientific results in animal 
behavior have been used to inform theoretical and applied ethics including legal de-
velopments, which can in turn inspire new research questions. These interdisciplinary 
interactions revolve around questions related to animal emotions, subjectivity and 
cognition, which have long been left aside by many scientists because such topics 
were seen as excessively challenging to address empirically, not to mention potential-
ly controversial, due to a prevailing fear of anthropomorphism in the disciplinary cul-
ture (de Waal 1999). Changes in society now push our research community to re-
examine some underlying assumptions in our methods, as well as to develop the inter-
disciplinary dialog required to tackle the challenges set by the study of animal mental 
states to the highest scientific standards. 
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The Problem with the Personhood Argument 
 
Zipporah Weisberg 
 
The premise of Shawn Thompson’s article – that empirical science is often under-
mined and/or inadequately represented in a legal context – is compelling. To demon-
strate the need for a new conceptual framework that is legible both to scientists and 
practitioners of law, Thompson focuses mainly on the struggles that Steven M. Wise, 
the head of the U.S. Nonhuman Rights Project (NhRP), which campaigns for legal 
personhood for great apes, elephants, dolphins, and whales, has faced upon filing ha-
beas corpus applications in United States courts on behalf of great apes. Thompson 
also draws on his own experience of participating in a project that sought personhood 
for Sandra, an orangutan held in captivity in Argentina. 
 
Thompson argues that the schisms between the scientific and legal conceptions of au-
tonomy, not to mention the fact that “a domain like the legal system has a very differ-
ent form of proof and rationality from science,” have made communicating across 
disciplinary divides (and ultimately arriving at judgments in favor of granting person-
hood to apes) an unnecessarily convoluted process. He maintains that to avoid arriving 
at the inevitable impasses, “a change in thinking about the research” is needed. Rather 
than compiling bits and pieces of scientific evidence that happen to illustrate great 
apes’ autonomy, as Wise has had to do thus far, scientific research could be shaped at 
the outset with the legal argument for personhood in mind. 
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On one hand, reframing research according to Thompson’s suggestion could be an 
important intervention into two systems that are apparently at odds with each other 
when it counts the most and when the stakes are highest (i.e. when they involve an 
animal’s wellbeing). If scientists shaped their research into great apes’ behaviour in 
ways that had direct relevance to the legal conception of personhood, perhaps the re-
search would be more convincing to judges and therefore more likely to sway their 
opinion in favor of great apes. On the other hand, as Lori Gruen points out, most re-
search conducted on great apes has been destructive to the animals themselves, 
whether due to the invasive nature of the research and/or to the conditions in which 
the animals are kept, and the deleterious psychological, social, and emotional impact 
these conditions have on them.1  If the new approach to research that Thompson posits 
is ultimately aimed at improving the lives of great apes, he should also insist that any 
research designed to advance personhood for these animals should be done in non-
invasive ways and in non-oppressive environments, such as sanctuaries or in the wild, 
where the flourishing of individual apes and their communities are in no way com-
promised. 
 
An even more fundamental concern is that while research organized along these (non-
invasive and observational) lines could be useful to advancing rights for great apes (or 
the other animals NhRP defends) in immediate and practical terms, it nevertheless 
runs the risk of perpetuating other species divides, namely by creating other ‘others’ 
who do not demonstrate the same human-like capacities that great apes (or elephants, 
dolphins, and whales) do. Thompson states outright that he is “following the research-
ers who believe that people and apes are so akin that the difference between them is 
one of degree, not kind” which, he concludes is “a good premise, if it is right, for ar-
guing rights for apes.” Thompson refers to apes as ‘fellow intelligent species’ and 
claims that apes ‘are sufficiently like human beings’ to warrant legal entitlement to 
relative (or ideally, total) freedom. This ‘like us’ position is also the one taken by Ste-
ven M. Wise and the NhRP. While on its website the NhRP states that its main goal is 
to “secure legally recognized fundamental rights for nonhuman animals through litiga-
tion, legislation, and education,” its campaigns focus solely on great apes, elephants, 
dolphins, and whales because of their human-like cognition, self-awareness, and 
(practical) autonomy.2  
 
But the question must be asked: why should having human-like cognition, self-
awareness, or autonomy be required for an animal to be entitled to protection from 
physical and psychological torture, sexual assault, and murder? While Wise, Thomp-
son, and others are well-intentioned and could make a difference in the lives of some 
individual animals (and perhaps other members of the species they defend), their ap-
proach is fundamentally flawed. Defending some select animals’ rights on the basis 
that they are similar to human beings in morally relevant ways is a very dangerous 
road to take. For a start, it fails to recognize how other animals’ characteristics and 
ways of being are meaningful and ethically relevant in and of themselves, without ref-
erence to human characteristics and experience. The ‘like us’ position creates a diffi-
cult and often impossible set of criteria for other animals to meet – impossible because 
they are derivative of specifically human capacities or characteristics and/or concep-
tions of what certain capacities or characteristics entail (such as, human-like intelli-
gence, self-awareness, and autonomy) and it privileges some species over the majority 
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of others, including those who are tortured and killed in the billions in the factory 
farming and medical research industries, among others.3 In the words of Taimie L. 
Bryant, “the similarity argument promotes pernicious hierarchical ordering of nonhu-
man animals based on their relative proximity to humans.” Bryant calls instead for an 
“anti-discrimination” approach in animal advocacy that, among other things, is based 
on “promoting respect for the diversity of animals” and accommodating their needs 
and desires accordingly.4 
 
The goal should not be to try to, as it were, squeeze (some) other animals into the eth-
ical circle by virtue of their human-like self-awareness, cognitive abilities, and auton-
omy. The goal should be to explode existing assumptions about what counts ethically 
in the first place. The richness and complexity of all nonhuman animal life should be 
recognized on its own terms and animals’ ethical (and legal) status should be radically 
transformed accordingly – with their particular forms of flourishing, with their partic-
ular needs, ethically (and legally) meaningful because they are meaningful to them, in 
mind. Other animals should be granted the right to freedom from harm and freedom to 
thrive on the basis of who they are and what is important to them, not on the basis of 
how they compare to who humans are and what is important to us. Humans do, of 
course, happen to share with other animals some of the most ethically (and legally) 
relevant needs and desires: to maintain our physical integrity and freedom, to not be 
confined, tortured, abused, neglected, or killed, to live freely in environments that 
promote flourishing, to eat nourishing food, to seek pleasure, love, and friendship, to 
socialize, to play, to nurse and raise our young, and so on. But the point is that these 
and other important features of animal life should not be deemed significant because 
they are also features of human life. 
 
In response to these criticisms of personhood, one might argue that if only as a strate-
gic measure the personhood approach is justified, at least in the short term. If one 
must penetrate into an unabashedly anthropocentric set of institutions to make a posi-
tive difference in the lives of long-suffering creatures such as chimpanzees and 
orangutans, why not play the proverbial game according its own rules? Why not focus 
on species that are the most like humans to win over the public as a first step towards 
opening their minds to the possibility of granting personhood to other animals? Or, if 
still uncomfortable with the anthropocentrism implicit in the above argument, one 
might turn to Gary Francione, who argues that sentience (as opposed to cognition, 
self-awareness, or autonomy) is a sufficient basis for granting personhood to animals 
who are currently deemed property under the law.5 
 
Another problem with the personhood approach to animal advocacy is that the line 
between the biological category of ‘human’ and the conceptual category of ‘person’ 
are often conflated (by the media, by members of the public, and even by leading 
voices on both sides of the debate). This leads to a certain panic that the distinct (evo-
lutionary, ontological, ethical, and legal) status of the human being could somehow be 
threatened or undermined.6 Of course, this panic is often itself the product of spe-
ciesism and human supremacism, which asserts that human beings occupy an ontolog-
ically (and therefore ethically and legally privileged) position over and above all other 
animals and beings. 
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Most importantly, as Maneesha Deckha notes, the legal personhood for animals 
should be abandoned as a goal because it is steeped in “exclusionary” and “reductive” 
biases. Throughout its history the concept of personhood, with its rationalist bent, has 
traditionally excluded women and people of color admitting, until relatively recently, 
only white men into its fold. While personhood is no longer limited to white men, it 
will be forever marred by these constitutive prejudices, it is therefore an unlikely ve-
hicle for progressive change.7 
 
Ultimately, while Thompson raises an interesting question about how enabling science 
and law to communicate more effectively might make it easier to secure rights for 
great apes, the personhood argument upon which he relies, and its ‘like us’ bias, seem 
to carry more risks than benefits for advancing apes’ and other animals’ rights. 
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Missing the Apes of the Trees for the Forest 
 
Carlo Alvaro 
 
The debate over ape personhood is of great social and moral importance. For more 
than twenty-five years, attorney Steven Wise has been arguing that animals who have 
cognitive complexities similar to humans should be legally granted basic rights of au-
tonomy. In my view, granting personhood status and other rights to great apes are at-
tainable goals. But how should we go about it? My worry is that Thompson’s suggest-
ed strategy relies on Kantian ethics, in particular on Kant’s notion of autonomy. In 
fact, I am worried about Kantian ethics in general because of its influence on morality 
and ultimately on our legal system. The problem is that Kant’s ethical system is rather 
strict because, accordingly, only those beings that have a rational nature can constrain 
us morally. By rational nature, Kant referred to one’s capacity to govern one’s self by 
autonomous, rational choice. Humans are rational beings and thus are morally im-
portant; they are ends-in-themselves because they are autonomous and capable of un-
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derstanding and legislating moral laws. Of course, not all humans are rational. There 
are the so-called marginal cases, small children, the feeble minded, and more, who are 
not autonomous. We may speculate as to what Kant might have thought of such indi-
viduals, but he never addressed the issue. Unfortunately for animals, Kant regarded 
them as mere means to our ends because they cannot govern themselves by autono-
mous rational choice. For Kant, Animals are objects without intrinsic moral value. In 
his Lecture on Ethics (1779), Kant said:  “But so far as animals are concerned, we 
have no direct duties. Animals are not self-conscious and are there merely as the 
means to an end. That end is man” (Kant, 239-241). Consequently, humans do not 
have direct moral obligations toward animals. 
 
Some Neo-Kantians argue that the view propounded by Kant can still speak in favor 
of animals. For example, Christine Korsgaard argues that Kant conflates two concep-
tions of “end-in-itself.” One is the source of normative claims recognized by all ra-
tional agents. And the other is someone who is able to give force to a claim by partici-
pation in morality. Animals cannot be ends-in-themselves in the second sense because 
they lack rationality and autonomy. But it does not follow that animals cannot be 
ends-in-themselves in the first sense: “there is no sense in which they can obligate us” 
(Korsgaard, 21). 
 
Korsgaard points out that as rational beings, we do not legislate, for example, against 
being lied to, being injured, being cheated on, etc., only because we are autonomous 
and rational beings, but also – perhaps most importantly – because bad things can as-
sault our animal nature. In other words, “we object to pain and torture or injury be-
cause they are bad for us as animal beings” (28). Kant himself held that respect for our 
rational nature involves respecting our animal nature. This is the ground for his 
arguments about our duties to ourselves, our self-preservation, the enjoyment of food, 
and sex. In the Metaphysics of Morals (1797), Kant discusses duties to ourselves as 
animal beings with respect to our animal nature. He covers the duties not to commit 
suicide, not to maim or disfigure oneself, not to masturbate, and more. Also, in Reli-
gion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793), Kant argues that our animal na-
ture is one of three “original predispositions to good in human nature” (Kant, 74). 
 
Thus animal nature is important. However, did Kant overlook the implications of his 
own principle regarding animals? I think not. Having an animal nature may be a suffi-
cient condition for having direct duties to other rational beings – but not a necessary 
condition. Our animal nature is, after all, “attached” to, comes with, a rational nature; 
but animals (according to Kant) are completely devoid of a rational nature. There is no 
clear textual evidence that Kant overlooked the possibility that animal nature be a 
source of normativity. Furthermore, there is no textual evidence that Kant would re-
gard animal nature alone as important enough to regard animals as ends-in-
themselves.  
  
The fundamental problem with Kant’s moral view is that it is ultimately concerned 
with notions of obligation and right conduct. The problem is the very conception of 
morality as a set of universal and authoritative norms by which all moral agents are 
categorically obligated to follow. My position is that such a conception of morality is 
defective; it is the very reason why nowadays animal advocates and lawyers have to 
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fight for animal rights. Deontology (and consequentialism as well, by the way) tells us 
to view the world from an individualistic point of view where one calculates what is 
right. Morality in my view is not about ourselves and how we use our individual re-
flections to derive categorically imperative norms. Rather, it is about relationship, care 
for others, and compassion. Thus, I question the concept of granting personhood on 
the basis of whether the animal in question is human-like. 
  
My feeling about duty morality and the Kantian concept of autonomy is that they 
seem plausible in theory, but fail in practice. Our moral outlook toward the environ-
ment, I want to suggest, has been disciplined by deontic (and utilitarian) principles. 
Such theories force us to accept the false dichotomy of individuals as rational or not 
rational; and make us wonder about our rational duty toward others. If we employ this 
kind of ethic to frame our moral questions, we find ourselves arguing abstractly about 
duty and rights, while missing other important aspects of morality, such as compas-
sion, care, relationship, and the acquisition of good moral character. Thus, I do not 
find it surprising that we currently face an environmental crisis and that we have to 
prove that animals are morally important.  
 
An alternative approach to morality is virtue ethics. Virtue ethics is primarily focused 
on good moral character. It suggests that we should approach morality by doing what 
is honest, charitable, compassionate, and do not do what is dishonest, uncharitable, 
and callous. Knowing right from wrong first requires cultivation of our moral charac-
ter. We should acquire virtues such as temperance, justice, and compassion, and prac-
tice temperate, just, and compassionate acts, at the right time and for the right reason. 
If the virtue ethics approach is right, we should abandon deontic and consequentialist 
principles and do what we can to acquire those virtues, and teach them to our children, 
in the hope that future generations may revert the environmental damage that has al-
ready been done and the speciesist bias that society has toward animals. In my view it 
is a virtuous character – and not the Kantian notion of autonomy – that will enable us 
to regard all animals as morally important and not as property. 
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▬ 
 
Peter Woodford 
 
Let me first thank Shawn Thompson for his thoughtful and fascinating essay that takes 
us to the front lines in legal battles over protections for apes. I am grateful for the op-
portunity to comment, and here I would like to focus on the concept of autonomy and 
on both the promise and peril of tying this notion too closely to the philosophy of Im-
manuel Kant in considerations of animal rights. 
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Thompson’s article presents a fascinating account of the interplay of science, legal 
reasoning, and the legal system as all of these institutions face complex questions 
about how we ought to treat other animals. Thompson’s title highlights that the signif-
icant relationship he wants to explore is between science and the law, but I think from 
his article it is clear that philosophy has an equally central role to play as well. 
Thompson’s account focuses on a very particular strategy for gaining legal recogni-
tion of animal rights, namely, through a habeas corpus application on behalf of apes 
held in captivity. Taking this strategy forces one particular concept to become crucial 
to the case for the legal protection of animal welfare: the concept of autonomy.  
 
As Thompson shows, one reason the concept of autonomy is crucial is that legal pro-
tections justified on grounds of autonomy already exist. This holds open the possibil-
ity that the freedom and welfare of apes should already be guaranteed as a logical ex-
tension of current law, without new legislation being necessary. Thompson remarks 
that autonomy has become crucial to how central figures in the battle for animal 
rights, such as Steven Wise, “craft a legal strategy.”1 Thus, it often appears as though 
Thompson accepts that this “strategy” is merely instrumental, in the sense that it is 
chosen because it is likely to be effective given current institutional circumstances, 
and not because it is necessarily the right or best way to understand why animals 
ought to have legally protected rights. Since I am not an expert in the law, I cannot 
comment on whether pursuing rights for animals through habeas corpus and under the 
legal protection of autonomy is, indeed, the optimal strategy for achieving the desired 
result most quickly. But I can say something about why autonomy has been thought to 
matter for morality and the law. Of course, the law is not identical to morality, and not 
all things that we might consider morally wrong are legally prohibited and vice-versa; 
the difference between the two is another topic that raises deep and important ques-
tions. But since the law is an instrument through which morally right relations be-
tween people – and in this case between humans and animals – can be established 
through coercion and threat of punishment, understanding the role of autonomy in 
moral philosophy can be a good guide and prelude for making the legal case. 
 
Thompson presents the central legal question that judges are to consider clearly: Are 
animals autonomous, according to the definition of the law? But what is the legal def-
inition of “autonomy”? As Thompson shows, there seems to be no universally agreed 
upon definition, and this is where judges and lawyers look to experts, which include 
both scientists and philosophers, to provide such definitions and to show when differ-
ent organisms fall under this definition. Indeed, in Thompson’s article there appear to 
be multiple candidate definitions of autonomy, and the legal debate has taken the 
shape of defenders and critics of animal rights arguing over which one ought to guide 
our legal decisions. Since experts do not agree about what autonomy is, individual 
judges are left in the position of having to decide whether to make a controversial rul-
ing that may be overturned later on. 
 
One expert that is often appealed to in questions of autonomy is the philosopher Im-
manuel Kant. Thompson refers to Kant frequently and shows us that Kant’s writings 
in moral theory seem to have some authority in legal considerations of animal rights 
under habeas corpus. This is understandable given that the concept of autonomy be-
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came central to moral philosophy largely through Kant, and Kant’s understanding of 
autonomy and of morality in general is still quite compelling to many thinkers today.  
 
The problem I see is that Kant’s notion of autonomy is something of a double-edged 
sword for discussions of animal rights. This is because Kant did not think that non-
human animals were autonomous.2 For Kant, autonomy is essentially the capacity for 
normative self-governance; it is the capacity to conceive of and to act according to an 
“ought” that legislates universal norms that dictate what anyone should do. It is the 
capacity that is called upon when one makes a claim on how others should behave, 
and so too in the construction of a legal system and the reflection on whose rights it 
should protect and recognize. Thus, autonomy – as the capacity to legislate at all, and 
to self-legislate – is not foremost an answer to the question of what is required to 
“count” as a being whose interests matter. It is rather the concept that helps us under-
stand what makes us beings who are subject to the norms of morality, norms that de-
mand of us that we respect the interests of others.  
 
Kant’s notion of autonomy is an answer to the question of who “ought” to behave 
morally, who should be held responsible and subject to praise and blame or sanction 
and punishment for their actions. Of course, no one in these legal debates seems to be 
arguing on the basis of autonomy that we should start holding animals responsible for 
their bad behavior, or that animals should behave morally, and this reflects an implicit 
acceptance of the difference between humans and other animals that Kant is trying to 
point to with his notion of autonomy. Even given how complex we are discovering 
that the lives of non-human animals are, it is highly questionable that we should think 
that they have or exercise this capacity for normative self-governance. Of course, we 
should notice here that many humans also do not exercise this capacity either tempo-
rarily or permanently, for example children or those with forms of mental disability.3  
 
Given Kant’s notion of autonomy, it seems easily defensible that I, and any judge who 
might be ruling according to Kant’s criterion of autonomy, might justifiably doubt that 
apes have the capacity to make laws, to act according to “oughts,” and to recognize 
the moral standing of others. This appears to be a reason why the decision to grant 
autonomy to apes is controversial, and why there is a looming worry that judicial de-
cisions could reasonably be overturned. Nonetheless, leading scholars of Kant’s moral 
theory have persuasively argued that Kant himself recognized (even if there are pas-
sages that suggest otherwise) that animals do not need to have autonomy in his sense 
in order to have moral standing, in the same way that he thought it immoral to treat 
children or the mentally disabled any way that one pleases simply because they may 
lack, temporarily or permanently, the capacity for normative self-governance.4 Of 
course, there are also scholars who see Kant’s notion of autonomy as not simply neu-
tral with respect to the case for animal rights, but inimical to it.5 However, if we ac-
cept the argument that, even for Kant, autonomy may not be the best criterion for 
whose interests “count” in a moral sense, then what is? While this a crucial question 
for making the case that Kant’s philosophy is not inimical to animal rights, it would 
lead into details of Kant’s thought that are not necessarily relevant to the point I want 
to make here.6 
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Thompson lists a variety of notions of autonomy that are different from Kant’s. 
Thinkers like Victoria Wobber, Tom Beauchamp, Steven Wise, and Jennifer Nedelsky 
have also informed how judges and advocates think about autonomy. Their proposals 
include the recognition that animals have interests and desires, that they can either 
suffer or flourish, that they represent the world in various ways, that they can have 
subjective experience and even a sense of self of some sort, and that they are subjects 
of a life, who lead a life in a meaningful sense. Again, these clearly need not require 
the capacity for normative self-governance, and these criteria seem much easier to 
establish in many diverse species. Indeed, while not being full-blown normative self-
governance, these are also the kinds of capacities that scholars of Kant argue were 
significant for his own recognition of the moral status of animals.7 It is also clear that 
these definitions of autonomy open up far more space for scientists to inform discus-
sions of animal ethics because scientists who study particular species are best posi-
tioned to understand the conditions in which they suffer or flourish, what their inter-
ests are, and what conditions allow them to freely lead their life. 
 
A lesson that I take away from Thompson’s informative article is that a serious hurdle 
exists in legal battles for animal rights that draw on the concept of autonomy, and that 
hurdle is Kant. As I have tried to show here, this is unfortunate given that a strong 
case to be made on Kantian grounds for the legal protection of animals, only this is 
not justified through the protection of their autonomy. Therefore, it seems as though 
the best strategy for moving forward may be to leave Kant out of the legal definition 
of autonomy altogether, or perhaps to take on this issue directly and argue to judges 
and lawyers that Kant’s thought is misused if it is used to deny moral or legal standing 
to non-human animals. For, as Kant thought, it is not because animals are autonomous 
that they possess “rights,” but rather because we are autonomous, self-legislating and 
moral beings that we understand it to be right to prevent, by means of the law, the un-
necessary harm of other creatures. 
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▬ 
 
Dustin Hellberg 
 
Thompson’s is an interesting and thought-provoking article. Unfortunately, I doubt 
that there will ever come, as the author suggests, a Lord Mansfield to rule in favor of 
apes’ personhood. This is not because the author has made a less salient case or that 
the issue does not warrant such weighty considerations. A few of the stumbling blocks 
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for any argument of this sort are as follows: descriptive v. normative qualifications, 
essentialist v. anti-essentialist theorizing, and is v. ought debates. I will focus primari-
ly on the descriptive v. normative issue for the sake of space. Let me first praise the 
sprawl of the article for trying to set boundary conditions that overlap these epistemo-
logically disparate ideas/methods. I believe that they may be related in theory, but the 
methods themselves can only be confederated in the loosest of ways. This particular 
difficulty will inevitably remain the biggest hurdle in such hybrid analyses.  
 
The fascinating thing about the ‘hard’ sciences is that they are more nebulous in their 
origins than most people care to admit. This is not to say that they are ad hoc, howev-
er. In seeking to describe the universe (or world, or species, etc.) in ever-more accu-
rate ways, science must remain descriptive as much as possible. But there are norma-
tive value judgments that either precede or follow scientific discoveries, hunches and 
stirrings in the mind that are not descriptive in their origins, but must be held out, once 
theorized, as objectively and descriptive as possible. When the author seeks to mix the 
codices of law, philosophy, and science, the descriptive and normative are suddenly 
thrust together. That there must be a continuum between ape and human practices is 
true, but can we make a checklist of a species’ demarcations from one to the next and 
then use that taxonomy as a bridge of similarity? Here, I mean a legal checklist. 
Would we not simply choose the criteria that best suit our starting hypothesis and ig-
nore the rest? This is fair (often unfortunately) game in the humanities, but I doubt 
that it would work in a hybrid legal/scientific setting. For example, if we define per-
sonhood merely by descriptive function rather than legal potential we radically blur 
the distinctions we must have in order to establish legal intention and culpability. 
Would we then put on trial the chimpanzee that bites a human’s face in the same way 
that we would hold a human responsible who bites a chimp’s face? We can hold the 
human to blame for harming the animal because the human has past/future rational 
awareness, has at least some rational understanding that such action is wrong and the 
human possesses the possibility for self-controlled behavior outside a laboratory set-
ting. The ape has many similar proto-human characteristics, all fascinating to study 
from ethology, but these characteristics are descriptive functions of an evolved simi-
larity between our species, not normative aspects of our legal statutes or cultures. An 
ape cannot defend another ape in court. Or, in a more abstract line of questioning, 
does an ape have dignity? Is the autonomy of the ape relational to the past and future 
status of the legal community in which it finds itself? While I truly sympathize with 
the author’s intentions, this first bulwark already looms.  
 
At the article’s end, the author says, “Maybe our ethics should be larger than just our 
own self-interest as a species.” Animal cruelty laws already exist, though our steward-
ship of the planet and the life on it is tragically negligent in too many ways to enumer-
ate. If ethics relate intentional action to past precedent (in the individual and commu-
nity) to present behavior in order to curtail undesirable future action, then again, I 
cannot see that ape personhood could be extended through something like an ape’s 
autonomy. It’s not that apes can’t act autonomously or that they don’t have individual 
personalities. Autonomy in this legal and philosophical sense relates to intentional 
action in the setting of public and civic norms, not to conditional-only situations out in 
the wild. It’s not that apes can’t advocate for themselves in the way that a brain-dead 
human can’t. It’s that the ape can’t potentially advocate for itself except via a proxy in 
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human civic institutions. Someone in a vegetative coma, were he or she not in such a 
coma, could undertake intentional action, after which we may judge his or her behav-
ior ethical or unethical. The category-shaving of what is ethical or moral or good or 
just is not at issue in this sense. The author’s appeal to Kant may not help. He would 
outright dismiss an ape’s ability to be a rational moral agent, no matter how autono-
mous that ape may be.  
 
Is it unfair to extend Kant’s categorical imperative to an orangutan? Maybe. However, 
could the orangutan act in such a way as to will the consequences of its action to be a 
universal law? Again, it seems to me, that potentiality is at issue. That humans may 
act irrationally and that an orangutan cannot act rationally is not equitable. If our 
boundary criterion remains autonomy (or rationality), then where do we draw the line 
for inclusion into personhood? Dolphins would have at least as much claim. Humans 
have an ethical and moral responsibility to act in ways least detrimental to our co-
inhabitants of this planet, and that argument doesn’t seem to require extending legal 
personhood to our primate cousins who cannot make their own case. They should def-
initely share in Kant’s kingdom of ends, but the demarcations will remain blurry so 
long as descriptive and normative definitions are brought together. As the author says, 
“We can’t prove that apes are human beings. We can only argue that apes are suffi-
ciently like human beings.” A glance at the news will certainly make one wonder 
whether some human beings are sufficiently like human beings, but that, again, 
doesn’t mean that the inability of humans to sometimes act rationally (or ethically, 
morally, etc.) relates to an ape’s incapacity to act rationally.  
 
An ape’s freedom is not an extension of its identity as a rational and intentionally-
oriented individual set inside a civic and legal community. Would we put a chimp on 
trial for killing a rival male from a neighboring group? The author has attempted a 
dizzyingly difficult feat and is to be lauded for this. By advocating for our evolution-
ary relatives, the author’s argument draws more attention to how we, as humans, 
ought to act as individuals, ought to behave as communities and ought to respect the 
frail and puzzling mystery of life on our lonely ball of rock that spins through the 
great dark.  
▬ 
 
C-ape-able of Deciding Personhood?  
 
Jennifer Vonk 
 
Clearly, the legal ramifications of great ape personhood are of critical importance in 
the current climate. Apes have suffered greatly at the hands of humans, both in terms 
of habitat loss and extermination in the wild and through the practice of captivity. For-
tunately, issues of animal welfare have reached the forefront of captive species man-
agement discussions and an increased awareness of the destruction humans wreak on 
the environment has led to increased conservation of natural habitats. Thompson takes 
an interesting and useful approach by attempting to translate science regarding ape 
minds into useful rhetoric for legal decisions regarding ape personhood. He skillfully 
articulates the challenges of applying science in an arena where scientific evidence is 
subservient to the oxymoron of subjective rationality. 
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This goal to inspire a scientific approach to operationalizing autonomy is worthwhile. 
Beyond the legal debate on ape personhood, the result could inform the evolutionary 
trajectory of conscious awareness and intelligence, and provide insights regarding the 
pressures that were likely in place to select such capacities. Thompson raises the right 
questions but provides few answers. In fairness, he made it clear that these are ques-
tions for scientists. However, it would have been ideal to mine more heavily the rich 
wealth of information from comparative researchers in making recommendations for 
future researchers and legal enforcers alike. 
 
Thompson stresses the importance of autonomy or the power to make “independent 
choices” in defining personhood. However, it is never really clear what the choices 
should be independent of. Even human choices are not made “independently.” Indeed, 
the argument over whether humans exhibit free will continues to rage (e.g., Willough-
by, et al., 2018). Thompson astutely hones in on a disconcerting aspect of King’s 
(2015) autonomy definition – the idea that behavior is directed on “some non-
observable internal cognitive process.” The question of how to measure internal pro-
cesses is one that continues to plague comparative psychologists despite decades of 
research directed precisely to this question. Thompson cites Beauchamp and Wob-
ber’s (2014) definition of autonomy that includes the components, “intentional, ade-
quately informed and free of controlling influences.” However, it seems that “inten-
tional” and “free of controlling influences” are related, if not dependent, processes. 
Furthermore, any act/decision is controlled by both external and internal factors, such 
as personality traits and genes, making it impossible to argue that any person is free of 
such influences. 
 
Later, Thompson introduces the concepts of sentience and rationality to the definition 
of autonomy, but it is not clear how these concepts fit Beauchamp and Wobber’s defi-
nition. Sentience is defined inconsistently across disciplines (Duncan, 2006), while the 
question of whether animals exhibit rationality has been hotly debated (e.g., Hurley & 
Nudds, 2006). It seems that the ‘adequately informed’ component requires metacogni-
tion, and ‘intentionality’ requires planning though neither construct is discussed. I 
agree with Thompson that innovation, altruism, self-control, and defiance are related 
to autonomy. However, although he briefly alludes to Beran and Hopkins’ (2018) 
work on self-control, the methodology and implications are not evaluated. Thompson 
could have written a more impactful piece by providing some explicit guidelines for 
how future research can appeal to legal arguments. 
 
Thompson suggests the simple and popular two-alternative-forced choice test for as-
sessing preferences in orangutans (and other nonverbal beings) where differential at-
tention or looking is measured rather than explicit choices. However, Thompson ne-
glects to consider that other species may not view two-dimensional images as repre-
sentations of real life objects or environments. Extensive work on this topic reveals 
mixed results – even for apes (Watanabe & Aust, 2017). Furthermore, it is difficult to 
imagine two-dimensional representations that could adequately convey differences 
between a captive orangutan’s current zoo habitat and her yet unexperienced sanctu-
ary option. It is also commonplace but dangerous to assume that sanctuaries always 
provide better environments for animals than zoos do. 
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It is interesting that the attorney general of Buenos Aires would claim that a court case 
decision in favor of an orangutan would sound the death knell on Darwin’s theory of 
evolution. Quite the contrary – Darwin is immortalized for his work suggesting that 
differences between humans and other species were “of degree rather than of kind,” 
thus advocating the idea of continuity between humans and other species, especially 
with other apes. Clearly, it is misinformed to talk of humans as descended from mon-
keys or monkeys from humans given that all extant species evolved from a common 
ancestor, not from each other. The goal should never be to show superiority or inferi-
ority on the basis of an evolutionary lineage but rather to show differences that are 
relevant to decisions that need to be made. Although Thompson references his lengthy 
response to the attorney general in which he made the valid point that “evolution is 
not a system of ethics...and...should not be used to make ethical decisions,” he misses 
an opportunity to invalidate such arguments here. Furthermore, there are some com-
mon biases that permeate Thompson’s discussion that are troublesome. I struggle to 
understand why arguments about reducing suffering and designing spaces ideal for 
different species should be specific to apes. 
 
One issue not addressed by Thompson is that of ownership. It is the case that any cap-
tive animal must have a human caretaker or spokesperson in order to live safely with-
in human society. So if we grant personhood, autonomy – however we define it – to 
nonhumans, who is responsible for them and for implementing the decisions made by 
the courts? It seems somewhat naïve, or at least premature, to eschew the concept of 
nonhumans as property of humans. Admittedly, the discussion of the type of change 
that is required to overthrow reliance on precedence and imagine a better world – one 
in which humans do not deem themselves superior to all other species – can only be-
come a reality if a movement to change perceptions is initiated by autonomous, in-
formed and intentional decisions. Perhaps my favorite line of the piece is “Maybe our 
ethics should be larger than just our own self-interest.” Interestingly, this quote per-
tains not just to decisions humans make regarding other species, but the decisions that 
they make regarding each other as well. Perhaps one day we will overcome our own 
biases and self-interest and choose equality for all. 
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Edwin J.C. van Leeuwen and Lysanne Snijders 
 
“Knowledge is power, but only wisdom is liberty.” 
— Will Durant  
 
Shawn Thompson’s essay provides an inspiring and thought-provoking perspective on 
the legal fight for acknowledgement of the fundamental right to bodily liberty for au-
tonomous species, in this case great apes. Thompson specifically calls upon science to 
assist the Non-Human Rights Project (NhRP) in their groundbreaking explication of 
possibly the most embarrassing “blind spot” of our time: regarding (autonomous) 
animals as “things.” 
 
Central in Thompson’s treatise is the question: ‘How can research be designed to de-
fine autonomy more clearly and to demonstrate autonomy in a stronger way to the 
court system?’ Here, Thompson’s emphasis, in line with the NhRP, is on chimpanzees 
– the species with which humans share more than 98% of their DNA, and for which 
an impressive body of affidavits with respect to their capacities and propensities has 
already been compiled by world-leading contemporary primatologists. We scientists 
progressively understand the intricate and intelligent modes in which chimpanzees 
perceive and act in this world as ends in themselves, even to the extent that we con-
clude that the differences between the human and chimpanzee species are merely one 
of degree, not kind. For example, chimpanzees are self-aware, empathize with victims 
of violence, plan for the future and mourn their dead. Yet, these insights do not mean 
a thing for chimpanzees’ fundamental rights if we cannot translate them into terms 
that speak to the court. 
 
Thompson, therefore, outlines four domains in which research could synchronize with 
the court, also by him referred to as the “Pillars of Autonomy”: innovativeness, altru-
ism, self-control and resistance. Thompson rightfully points out that current evidence 
already speaks to chimpanzees’ capacity to innovate beyond what is endowed upon 
them by genetic and environmental influences – a capacity that illustrates chimpan-
zees’ pro-active being-in-the-world. With respect to the other domains, the current 
evidence might be equally substantial, although more examples may better serve the 
purpose of the whole endeavor: convincing the judge that chimpanzees are sentient, 
autonomous beings, who can be ‘wronged.’ 
 
In an attempt to provide more convincing examples, thereby following Thompson’s 
emphasis on the importance of scrutinizing beings’ behavior in light of their suscepti-
bility to “controlling influences,” we would point to chimpanzees’ rational decisions 
against group pressure (anti-conformist), their ability to restrain themselves from 
choosing immediate rewards when future rewards may be superior, and their unyield-
ing stubbornness when they choose to mourn their loved ones in the face of both con-
specific pressure (i.e., the group moves on) and human efforts to control the scene 
(i.e., luring the chimpanzees away in order to be able to retrieve the body from the 
enclosure). We would; if it wasn’t for the emerging picture that it is apparently insuf-
ficient to provide evidence of beings’ ability to act autonomously in the world for the 
plea for basic rights to be honored. In fact, judges do not appear to question that 
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chimpanzees have the capacities to be considered as autonomous beings. So where 
does that leave science? 
 
Lacking the potentially fruitful possibility to sit down with the judges and directly ask 
them what evidence would sway them in favor of granting basic rights to non-human 
beings, we follow Thompson’s advice and contemplate on how best to translate scien-
tific insights into legal language. One strategy could be to apply the scientific method 
to understand the legal system itself, or particularly, how judges think, evaluate and 
decide. We could, for instance, conduct experiments in which judges are blinded to 
the identity of the habeas corpus applicant: what would it take for the judge to consid-
er the applicant as “person”? Which prerequisites for personhood would turn out to be 
fundamental? By exposing the considerations crucial to judges’ rulings in favor of 
personhood, such experiments could guide the endeavor of pleading for non-human 
rights in the real courtroom. A related scientific application could entail the scrutiny 
of judges’ previous rulings in relevant cases by means of established tools for qualita-
tive research (e.g., based on the “grounded theory”) or even sophisticated algorithms 
designed to detect logical patterns in written text. This “know thy opponent” approach 
might generate valuable insights that can be used for expediently formulating the legal 
arguments accompanying the habeas corpus filings. 
 
Additionally, it might be worth contemplating how one might build measures into the 
legal system to make judgments more objective, e.g., in regard to the identity of the 
applicant. Law and science both aim to be rational and objective, but where science 
has introduced double blind peer review (i.e., the identities of all stakeholders in-
volved remain anonymous), Law may still be tainted by the (implicit) biases that hu-
mans invariably possess. Such biases do not merely come in conspicuous forms like 
speciesism, but can also subtly jeopardize objectivity through tendencies to decide 
conservatively rather than liberally. For a judge to rule against a non-human habeas 
corpus filing means to go-with-the-flow, to reiterate the status-quo. For a judge to rule 
in favor of this same habeas corpus filing means to stand out, to risk not only strange 
looks by fellow judges, but possibly also society’s scorn more generally. 
 
Another strategy by which science could aid the fight for non-human animal rights 
might, therefore, be to portray the effects of granting fundamental rights to (certain) 
chimpanzees on society’s functioning. “Will my ruling cause a ruckus?” may plausi-
bly be a question floating through judges’ minds while contemplating the habeas cor-
pus plea for chimpanzees. Fear for consequences or even repercussions is a deep-
seated trait in social species, including – or perhaps better said: especially for – hu-
mans, and may thus represent an (implicit) bias in decisions with potentially high-
stake ramifications. By modeling the socio-economic effects for different versions and 
magnitudes of judges’ rulings, we may be able to, implicitly, weigh down the angst 
component contributing to judges’ current tendency towards conservative decisions. 
Effectively, we would create a situation in which less bravery is required to rule in 
favor of non-human rights by illustrating just how “normal” a society could function 
in which some or even all autonomous species have been granted fundamental rights. 
It’s perhaps not the way a court of law should work, but in pursuit of identifying one 
of the most embarrassing “blind spots” of our time, we may be justified in applying 
some unconventional approaches. 
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In conjunction, our suggestions in line with Thompson’s advice to calibrate the scien-
tific enterprise with the legal system could hopefully serve as an impetus to generate a 
more encompassing “think-tank” with the aim to explore the poignant issue of trans-
forming the legal status of (autonomous) non-human animals from “things” to “per-
sons.” With an open mind, and in unison with all people regardless of (scientific) 
background, we may go beyond mere knowledge on the extent of a being’s sentience 
toward wisdom with respect to the living force that binds us. 
▬ 
 
Leif Cocks 
 
This essay is an insightful analysis by Shawn Thompson. In particular, his comparison 
between scientific and legal principles, surrounding such words as ‘person’ and ‘au-
tonomy’ are noteworthy. His insight can only benefit the quest for non-human rights. 
As a knowledgeable ‘outsider,’ Thompson brings a unique and insightful perspective 
linking two disciplines – law and science. Most profoundly Thompson exposes an 
important fallacy. That is, how the basis of human rights, used to exclude non-
humans, is based on an idealist image of ourselves, a supra-rational human acting on 
pure reason, that in reality few humans live up to. In other words, we hold a falsely 
high threshold for rights that in reality would exclude many, if not most humans. Im-
portantly, Thompson also exposes the intellectual weakness of those who often argue 
against the expansion of rights, whether to a different race, sex or species – that is, 
how the expansion of rights would reduce the rights of those who currently gain privi-
lege from the denial of their rights to others. Like Thompson, I hope that with a new 
generation that this moral and intellectual conceit will become so obvious that it will 
be finally consigned to the history books. 
▬ 
 
How to Resist Anxiety When You Write an Overly Ambitious  
Article about Science, the Law and Animal Rights 
 
Response to Comments, by Shawn Thompson 
 
In reply to the comments to my article, maybe I should explain why I don’t feel anx-
ious about the expediency of employing science to win legal rights for autonomous 
species like apes, elephants and dolphins. 
 
Yes, it is a big world of animal rights, with many different living creatures who de-
serve fair treatment. 
 
And, yes, autonomous species should not be valued just by how they are like human 
beings. I would somewhat playfully suggest instead that human beings should be val-
ued by how they are like apes and have written elsewhere about how useful it is to 
understand our ape kin to get some clarity in our own lives. Those somewhat playful 
comments aside, apes and human beings have some startling similarities and some 
startling differences. In court, the argument that apes are “like” human beings rather 
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than unlike human beings is a legal argument for equality. Creatures who are alike 
deserve to be treated alike. It would be a more difficult argument to propose that crea-
tures who are different, deserve, on the basis of their differences, to be treated alike. 
We don’t have to accept a simple notion of similarity to recognize that it may be use-
ful as an argument to persuade those who need a justification they believe is reasona-
ble. Personally, I think it would be more reasonable to value autonomous species on 
terms detached from the interests of human beings, as part of one larger and harmoni-
ous community of living creatures. The primatologist and philosophers whom I revere 
are the ones who understand how intelligent species are not mere reflections in the 
mirror of human nature and who have the courage to take that position against popular 
sentiment despite the consequences. 
 
And yes, two hundred years ago the philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) may 
have dismissed animals for not being rational, self-conscious or autonomous, although 
he also classes human beings as animals, but animals with the capacity for reason. 
And yet I would argue that the usefulness of Kant is still alive now in that his ideas 
can surely accommodate new information, such as evidence that intelligent species are 
self-conscious and autonomous that was produced after his death. We can imagine 
that Kant is reasonable enough to accept new evidence and to allow his thought to be 
adaptable.  
 
But, mainly, for the purposes of my article, I took the position that it is important to 
pick your battles, your time and your place. Steven Wise of the U.S. Nonhuman 
Rights Project has done that and the basis of my article comes from what I learned 
from him. Wise has found an ingenious way to use the legal system to possibly win 
personhood rights for autonomous species using the rules of rationality of that legal 
system. After my conversation with Wise in 2015, I realized that I had to grapple with 
Immanuel Kant, however unwilling I was to do that. I have now read more about Kant 
than I would ever wish to, making far less progress than would justify the effort. I 
blame Steven Wise totally for that ordeal. 
 
But why personhood rights? Some comments to my article argue that personhood 
rights are not the best protection for animals. Some comments talk about the alterna-
tive of the legal protection of legislation against cruelty to animals. And one of the 
objections in the comments is that a legal focus on winning rights for autonomous 
species neglects the rights of all other animals.  
 
When I put these additional issues to Steven Wise while he was taking a break from 
court in December in San Francisco, he responded by email that personhood rights are 
valuable for autonomous species for the same reason that human beings put the high-
est value on them. “They are the best protection,” Wise said, “for nonhuman animals 
in the way that personhood is the best protection for human animals. That is why both 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights says in Article 6 that ‘Everyone has the 
right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’ and why the International 
Convention on Social and Political Rights says in Article 16 that ‘Everyone shall have 
the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law.’ Without recognition 
as a ‘person’ no one has the capacity for the legal rights that protect them. Person-
hood,” says Wise, “is the foundation for rights and enforceable protections.” Wise 
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then playfully challenges anyone who doesn’t believe this point to demonstrate their 
principles by surrendering their personhood rights. 
 
I didn’t spend time in my article examining the benefits of legal personhood focused 
as I was on how to adapt science to create stronger support in court to win a habeas 
corpus application for autonomous species. But, in response to the comments, it is 
worth observing that the opponents in court to a habeas corpus application for intelli-
gent species also argue in support of the alternative of existing animal welfare or anti-
cruelty legislation. They argue for anti-cruelty legislation because they know how 
much more limited it is and less threatening to the status quo than personhood rights. 
Yes, more effort could be made to expand anti-cruelty legislation, but, practically, 
there is likely a significant limit to the extent of rights that could be won by changing 
this legislation. 
 
The issue of anti-cruelty legislation was discussed in late December 2018 in connec-
tion with an elephant named Happy in an article by Brandon Keim posted online at 
The Atlantic magazine. The case of the elephant is an example that what seems cruel 
treatment to some, seems to be a ridiculous sentimentality to others. Wise, in his court 
cases, describes the conditions suffered by intelligent species in a way that reflects the 
greater capacity for suffering in the context of consciousness and personhood. Wise 
argued in a habeas corpus hearing before The New York Supreme Court in December 
2018 that the forty-seven-year-old Asian elephant who was held in a kind of solitary 
confinement at the Bronx Zoo deserves her freedom. “The proceeding,” says Wise, 
“was the world’s first habeas corpus hearing on behalf of an elephant and the second 
habeas corpus hearing on behalf of a nonhuman animal in the U.S., both of which 
were secured by the Nonhuman Rights Project. In our argument, we focused on why 
an autonomous being such as Happy is a legal person with the fundamental right to 
bodily liberty protected by a common law writ of habeas corpus.” It is a crucial legal 
point that the principles of the law protect liberty and autonomy. “Courts,” Wise told 
me, “value autonomy and it should therefore be protected wherever it is found.” 
Keim’s article reviews the progress of anti-cruelty legislation in the United States 
from a misdemeanor decades ago, to a felony, but that progress is limited. To make 
that point, Keim quotes Chris Green, the executive director of Harvard Law School’s 
Animal Law and Policy Program, as saying, “In the vast majority of jurisdictions, if 
someone beats your dog to death in front of you, all you can sue him for is the cost of 
buying another dog.” Keim adds that “Animal-welfare laws also depend on govern-
ment intervention. Citizens can’t file suit on behalf of animals they don’t own. Ani-
mal-welfare laws fall short of actual rights.” Keim cites a news release after the De-
cember hearing (which is awaiting adjudication in 2019) from the owner of the Bronx 
Zoo, the Wildlife Conservation Society, that the Nonhuman Rights Project lawsuit 
over the elephant is “an academic exercise” intended to “promote their radical philo-
sophical view of ‘personhood.’” Keim says the society insists that the way Happy is 
held in captivity in the zoo complies with the existing animal welfare standards. In 
response, Wise, with the disciplined focus of a lawyer, says that the Nonhuman Rights 
Project insists that the manner in which Happy is being treated at the Bronx Zoo is 
“irrelevant to the issue of whether she may be illegally imprisoned, just as it would be 
irrelevant to the issue of whether a human being may be illegally imprisoned.” Even if 
the elephant were being treated well, that does not justify incarceration. 
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In contrast to animal welfare legislation, personhood rights, if they were won in court 
for autonomous species, would likely begin with the right to bodily liberty, which was 
one of the three rights proposed in A Declaration of Great Apes (1993) promoted by 
the Great Ape Project. The other two rights proposed were the right to life and the 
prohibition of torture. Anti-cruelty legislation does not go that far. In general, anti-
cruelty legislation serves the interests of human beings by allowing animals to be 
killed, imprisoned and deprived of a full and meaningful life. Personhood rights go 
beyond the limited concept of cruelty, beyond what is merely convenient for human 
beings, beyond the limited legal duties of human beings to animals, to a type of basic 
equality. This equality is radical and shocking to those who believe in the unrestricted 
rights of human beings to do what they want to the rest of the natural world.  
 
My proposal was based on an expedient use of science and the law to support the ini-
tiative of Steven Wise and a team of lawyers working through the Nonhuman Rights 
Project to accomplish the unthinkable, a radical change to extend to other living crea-
tures the basic rights that human beings have reserved for themselves alone. That 
would not only be a legal victory and a moral victory, but a huge symbolic victory for 
a change in the perception of the relationship between human beings and the natural 
world. Society in general might find this kind of a decision in court baffling and in-
comprehensible. But the law can be a mirror, as it was with Lord Mansfield ruling 
against slavery, that reflects a future towards which we should want to strive. 
 
So, I don’t feel anxious about the expediency of using the rational systems of either 
natural science or the law that I might not agree with or an obscure philosopher from 
two hundred years ago that I struggle to understand, to get justice for intelligent spe-
cies now. Win this battle first, then move on to the next battle, to gradually enlarge the 
ethical treatment of living creatures. 
 
As I said, my proposal was “to start a discussion with this article of how research 
could be designed to fit the legal argument of Wise that a habeas corpus application 
should apply to a chimpanzee because the creature meets the basic legal principle of 
autonomy.” 
 
Kant is credited with helping us see the crucial role that the principle of autonomy 
should play in understanding the essence of a human being and the means to act ethi-
cally. Some thinkers even credit Kant with “inventing” autonomy.  
 
Kant’s principle of autonomy, as animal rights lawyer Steven Wise realized, also un-
derlies the rationality of the legal system and thus opens a way to argue for rights of 
intelligent species as autonomous creatures. But that is not proposing to actually argue 
Kant in court, where a lawyer might be surprised to face a judge who is also a scholar 
of Kant. It is also not proposing that the whole of Kant’s philosophy should be the 
circumference of the argument. Instead, studying Kant would be useful to help sharp-
en specifically the understanding of how autonomy could be argued in court and how 
research could be designed to support an argument of autonomy in intelligent species. 
There are scholars of Kant like Paul Guyer and J.B. Schneewind who could develop 
this better than I can. 
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Steven Wise used an amicus brief in court in 2018 that helps define how research fits 
the legal issue of mental capacities and autonomy: “[T]he well-known U.S. bioethicist 
and philosopher, Tom Beauchamp, together with the comparative psychologist, Victo-
ria Wobber, have suggested that an act is autonomous if an individual self-initiates an 
‘action that is (1) intentional, (2) adequately informed...and (3) free of controlling in-
fluences.’” The idea that autonomy is “free of controlling influences” is also a princi-
ple of Kant. The 2018 brief specifically mentions Kant. 
 
Building on concepts like this that are explained in more detail in my article, I pro-
posed four possible conceptualizations as a starting point in a discussion of how re-
search might be designed to support an autonomy argument in court: 1. innovation, 2. 
altruism, 3. self-control, and 4. resistance, disobedience, or defiance. I should empha-
size again that this was intended as the starting point of a discussion, with some spe-
cific examples to stimulate discussion. I was not anxious about the provisional nature 
of this proposal or the possibility that others could develop other conceptualizations 
that would also support a legal argument of autonomy. There are scientists who can 
develop this better than I can. 
 
I cautioned that the four possible conceptualizations I offered “are typically disrup-
tions, paradoxes and enigmas and thus difficult to understand and to study with the 
tools of rationality.” If true autonomy is a radical departure and break from what is 
known, like dark matter or dark energy or black holes or the origin of time, it may be 
hard to explain and accept in terms of what is known. But, then, this kind of a concen-
tration in research might also open new frontiers in understanding other species. 
 
Some comments to my article raised doubt that intelligent species can be autonomous 
and self-governing in the Kantian sense, or that they can make moral decisions, 
which, as Wise says, is also true of a huge proportion of human beings “who are not 
autonomous in the Kantian sense.” The question of autonomy in apes has fascinated 
me for years and it is a question I often ask scientists and zoo keepers who work di-
rectly with orangutans. The answers I hear are yes, orangutans can make moral deci-
sions, which is why I put altruism on the list to investigate. As well, Jane Goodall, for 
one, claims in The Great Ape Project: Equality Beyond Humanity (1993) that chim-
panzees are “capable of true altruism.” For human beings, including scientists, that 
will likely always be a debatable point, but at least it deserves genuine consideration. 
Meanwhile, the Nonhuman Rights Project has already supplied hundreds of pages of 
affidavits from respected chimpanzee and elephant scientists that assert that chimpan-
zees and elephants are indeed autonomous. If Wise and the Nonhuman Rights Project 
win the battle for autonomous species in court, it would also be a crucial enlargement 
of the principle of autonomy for us to absorb beyond its current narrowly human 
scope. 
 
I also spent some time, in an article with an apparent focus on rationality, on the irra-
tional side of the court system, which Steven Wise knows well, and how progress 
through the court system needs to consider that irrationality as well in order to win in 
court through the good fortune of finding the boldness of a courageous judge, the next 
Lord Mansfield. 
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What I called an “overlap” between the different domains of rationality in natural sci-
ence and the law, some commentators, quite rightly, called, in stronger language, ei-
ther a “false divide” or a “schism.” The point is that there may be irreconcilable dif-
ferences between the rationality of the two domains of natural science and the law, but 
I also don’t feel anxious about this intellectual problem at the moment, simply be-
cause it does not seem to be an issue in court. Besides, conflict and difference may be 
an engine of innovation and creativity. Harmonizing the different rational domains 
might impoverish us. Out of their clash, might come new ideas. 
 
Yet, I have to admit that I am not without anxiety at all. At sixty-seven years of age 
and teaching in university a younger generation that is absorbed in its own autono-
mies, I think too much about using time wisely. I have trekked through the jungles of 
Borneo to see the orangutans who are disappearing as a species from the planet. It is 
incredible to watch these fellow creatures in a tropical forest where they make their 
own decisions in a life that they fit to themselves. Among the marvels I have seen– 
and would miss – are the unique acrobatic pleasures of orangutans, their affinity for 
humor and laughter, their deep and uncanny curiosity. The people who know these 
things about orangutans know orangutans as individuals and not just abstract objects 
for the human intellect. I am anxious about the loss of this, about the path of the ex-
tinction of species down which we are travelling at a terrible speed. The clock is tick-
ing. The victories that may come will be too little, too late. And for those anxieties of 
time and of extinction I have no answers. 
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